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Abstract. Central to modern copyright law is the test for determining infringement, 
famously developed by Judge Jerome Frank in the landmark case of Arnstein v. Porter. The 
“Arnstein test,” which courts continue to apply, demands that the analysis be divided into 
two components: actual copying—the question whether the defendant did in fact copy—
and improper appropriation—the question whether such copying, if it did exist, was 
unlawful. Somewhat counterintuitively, though, the test treats both components as pure 
questions of fact, requiring that even the question of improper appropriation go to a jury. 
This jury-centric approach continues to influence modern copyright law and is 
responsible for the subjective and unpredictable nature of the infringement analysis in 
copyright infringement lawsuits. Examining the memoranda, correspondence, and 
extrajudicial writings of the three judges who decided the Arnstein case reveals that the 
court’s decision to empower the jury was driven almost entirely by Judge Frank’s unique 
legal philosophy—his skeptical views about judicial factfinding and his desire to control 
lower court decisionmaking. Characterizing the entire infringement analysis as a purely 
factual one provided him with a perfect mechanism for giving effect to his skepticism. The 
Arnstein test thus had very little to do with substantive copyright law and policy, a reality 
that copyright jurisprudence has thus far ignored altogether in its continuing affirmation 
of the opinion’s framework. This Article disaggregates the complex issues that were at 
play in Arnstein to show how the opinion was rooted in a dystopian vision of the 
adjudicative process that has since come to be universally repudiated and argues that it 
may well be time for copyright jurisprudence to reconsider its dogmatic reliance on 
Arnstein, thereby freeing copyright law from one of its best-known malaises. 
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Introduction 
The U.S. Constitution guarantees to individuals the “right of trial by jury” 
in all civil suits at common law.1 Lawsuits seeking damages for copyright 
infringement have been understood as “suits at law” that are subject to this 
right.2 Demands for jury trials in copyright infringement lawsuits are today a 
staple in the world of copyright litigation. While a vast majority of these 
claims either settle prior to trial or are instead dismissed through motions, on 
the rare occasion that a jury is indeed empaneled to hear a case, courts continue 
to be confounded by a somewhat basic issue: the proper role of the jury in the 
copyright infringement analysis.  
The copyright infringement analysis involves determining whether a 
defendant copied the plaintiff1’s protected work, a question that embodies 
elements of both fact and law. It entails ascertaining facts about the defendant’s 
conduct and then making a normative judgment about the legality of such 
conduct.3 Classifying these issues appropriately and dividing them up between 
judge and jury remains a complex undertaking—one that the parties routinely 
disagree about.4 Indeed, the spate of criticism surrounding the jury verdict in 
the copyright infringement case involving the song “Blurred Lines” vividly 
illustrates the complexity of empaneling juries to determine the existence of 
copyright infringement.5 
	
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 2. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 346 (1998); Video Views, 
Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010, 1014 (7th Cir. 1991); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & 
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.10[A] (rev. ed. 2015) (“[I]t is beyond dispute 
that a plaintiff who seeks to recover actual damages is entitled to a jury trial . . . .” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 3. For a general discussion of the copyright infringement test, see Shyamkrishna 
Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 203, 214-33 (2012); 
Alan Latman, “Probative Similarity” as Proof of Copying1: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in 
Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1188-89 (1990); and Mark A. Lemley, 
Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 719, 
719-22 (2010). 
 4. Disagreement over the judge-jury divide is well known in other areas of law. See, e.g., 
LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930) (discussing the role of the judge and jury in tort 
law); Fleming James, Jr., Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667 
(1949) (analyzing and comparing the functions of judge and jury in negligence cases). 
For a general discussion of the judge-jury divide, see Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury 
Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1867 (1966), which discusses the 
difference between “questions of law” and “questions of fact” as they relate to the judge-
jury divide. 
 5. See, e.g., Wendy Gordon, The Jury in the ‘Blurred Lines’ Case Was Misled, NEWSWEEK 
(Mar. 18, 2015, 2:30 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/jury-blurred-lines-case-was 
-misled-314856; Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon Sprigman, Squelching Creativity1: What 
the “Blurred Lines” Team Copied Is Either Not Original or Not Relevant, SLATE (Mar. 12, 
2015, 12:27 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence 
footnote continued on next page 
Questionable Origins of Copyright Infringement Analysis 
68 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2016) 
794 
 
The complexity of the modern copyright infringement analysis cannot be 
overstated. Often referred to as the “substantial similarity” requirement, its 
structure, scope, and purpose continue to confound courts and scholars—
perhaps even more so (and more routinely) than the infamous fair use doctrine. 
Copyright’s infringement analysis has been variously described as “bizarre,”6 
“mak[ing] no sense,”7 “viscid,”8 and “problematic.”9 Indeed, recently the Ninth 
Circuit chose to “withdraw” its model jury instructions on the analysis,10 
recognizing that no amount of abstract guidance could resolve the indelible 
complexity that the analysis routinely engenders. In short, despite the 
centrality of the infringement analysis to copyright law, its complexity 
renders it a virtual black hole in copyright jurisprudence. 
Even though the Supreme Court has never weighed in on the matter, 
courts around the country take their guidance on the copyright infringement 
analysis from a landmark decision of the Second Circuit that is believed to have 
defined the structure of the infringement inquiry and the jury’s role in it: 
Arnstein v. Porter.11 Although the opinion was handed down nearly seven 
decades ago, courts, scholars, and lawyers consider the Second Circuit’s 
infringement analysis to be part of the modern copyright law canon.12 While a 
few circuits have made important modifications to its central approach, the 
“Arnstein test,” as it has come to be known, remains the dominant approach to 
copyright infringement analysis today.13 
The Arnstein test for copyright infringement involves two distinct steps. 
The first requires the decisionmaker to determine whether the defendant 
	
/2015/03/_blurred_lines_verdict_is_wrong_williams_and_thicke_did_not_infringe
_on.single.html; Tim Wu, Why the “Blurred Lines” Copyright Verdict Should Be Thrown 
Out, NEW YORKER (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture 
-desk/why-the-blurred-lines-copyright-verdict-should-be-thrown-out. 
 6. Lemley, supra note 3, at 719 (capitalization altered). 
 7. Id. 
 8. BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 48 (1967). 
 9. Pamela Samuelson, A Fresh Look at Tests for Nonliteral Copyright Infringement, 107 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1821, 1823 (2013). 
 10. See NINTH CIRCUIT MANUAL OF MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 17.17 (2007) 
(withdrawn).  
 11. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 12. See, e.g., Batiste v. Najm, 28 F. Supp. 3d 595, 599 (E.D. La. 2014) (noting that the Arnstein 
test “continues to be employed”); RONALD S. ROSEN, MUSIC AND COPYRIGHT 208 (2008) 
(noting that Arnstein “rises like a phoenix from the ashes” to influence infringement 
analysis); Samuelson, supra note 9, at 1827 (observing that the Arnstein “dictum lives 
on”). 
 13. See, e.g., Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 733 (4th Cir. 1990) (describing 
Arnstein as “the source of modern theory”); Lemley, supra note 3, at 719 (describing 
Arnstein as representing “the majority approach”). 
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actually “copied” from the plaintiff1’s work, ordinarily a factual question for the 
jury. Without proof of copying, there can be no copyright infringement.14 To 
prove copying, the decisionmaker looks to whether the defendant had access to 
the protected work and whether the two works are indeed similar such that 
copying may be inferred circumstantially.15 These twin elements of proof are 
often referred to as the elements of “access” and “probative similarity.”16 
Additionally, during this step the decisionmaker is permitted to rely on the 
testimony of experts in the field of the works under scrutiny (e.g., a 
musicologist or art expert) about the inferences that may be drawn given 
accepted practices in the field.17 The decisionmaker may also break the work 
down into its component parts as part of the analysis, a process that is known 
as “dissection.”18  
Once the jury determines as a factual matter that the disputed work has 
been copied, the next step is to determine whether the copying was substantial 
enough to be deemed illicit or wrongful—and therefore legally actionable.19 
Somewhat counterintuitively, this second step is treated as a purely factual 
question and therefore within the purview of the jury.20 This second step 
attempts to measure the subjective reaction of the jury to the copying.21 
Consequently, expert testimony and analytic dissection are treated as 
presumptively irrelevant and therefore inadmissible.22 Almost all courts 
around the country adhere to this two-step formulation in one way or another 
	
 14. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Latman, supra note 3, at 1204-09 (describing the use of these terms and arguing for 
greater precision). For an example of a case accepting this usage, see Repp v. Webber, 
132 F.3d 882, 889 & n.1, 891 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 17. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468; see also MARK S. LEE, ENTERTAINMENT AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW § 1.37 (West 2015) (describing “analytic dissection” as the process 
wherein a court “dissects the copyrighted work, disregards non-copyrightable 
elements, and compares only the protectable elements of the copyrighted work to the 
allegedly infringing work”). 
 18. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 469.  
 21. Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1398 n.4 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(describing the second step as entailing an evaluation of a “subjective, audience-
response level” (quoting Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 
1566 (S.D. Cal. 1996))). In the Ninth Circuit, this second step is characterized as a 
subjective test, building on the Arnstein test. See Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 
F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 22. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. 
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and continue to disallow any expert testimony or objective analysis of the 
works during this second step.23 
The decision in Arnstein is thus to be credited with (or faulted for) giving 
juries significant control over the infringement analysis. In treating the 
question of “wrongful” or “illicit” copying as a pure question of fact, precluding 
expert testimony on it, and then requiring juries to base their decision on what 
an “ordinary lay hearer” or ordinary observer would conclude,24 Arnstein in 
effect cabined trial courts’ (i.e., judges’) supervision over the question of 
copyright infringement. Over the years, Arnstein’s empowerment of the jury in 
this regard has come to be accepted as law.25 In addition, Arnstein’s decision to 
hand the issue over to the jury has also come to be rationalized as comporting 
with the overall motivating utilitarian ideals of copyright law. Arnstein’s 
deference to juries is treated as a deliberate one, aimed at examining the 
potential market effects of the defendant’s actions by assessing the reaction—to 
the copying—of the work’s intended “audience.”26 And so the practice of 
allowing juries to decide the legality of a defendant’s copying (i.e., its 
wrongfulness) continues unabated and enters into the public spotlight every 
few years when a jury finds a well-known work to be infringing.27 
The Arnstein court’s decision to give juries complete control over the 
question of improper appropriation in the infringement analysis has over time 
proven to be immensely problematic for copyright law. While juries are 
required to determine whether the copying was “improper,” they are not given 
any discernible criteria for the investigation (other than terms such as “total-
	
 23. See ROBERT C. OSTERBERG & ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN COPYRIGHT 
LAW 3-2 & n.1 (2015) (observing that most courts use one of two tests, both of which 
originate in Arnstein); id. § 17:1 (“[T]he majority rule is that expert testimony may not 
be considered with respect to substantial similarity . . . .”). 
 24. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. Some courts have applied Arnstein to develop the test into an 
“ordinary observer” test. See Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 271-72 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 25. To the extent that a judge may grant summary judgment in some jurisdictions, it is 
only on the basis that no reasonable juror could have possibly arrived at a contrary 
decision. See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 23, § 3:1.4[A]-[B]. Thus, it is accepted 
as a jury question. In some jurisdictions, courts remain extremely reluctant to award 
summary judgment on the second question. Id. § 3:2.1[F]. 
 26. Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1990) (“In light of the 
copyright law’s purpose of protecting a creator’s market, we think it sensible to 
embrace Arnstein’s command that the ultimate comparison of the works at issue be 
oriented towards the works’ intended audience.”). 
 27. See sources cited supra note 5 (discussing the “Blurred Lines” case); see also Frustrated 
Michael Bolton Ready to Move On, BILLBOARD (1Jan. 30, 2001, 12:00 AM EST), 
http://www.billboard.com/articles/news/80666/frustrated-michael-bolton-ready-to 
-move-on (discussing the jury award against Michael Bolton for copyright 
infringement); Corey Moss, Jury Orders Dr. Dre to Pay $1.5 Million for Copyright 
Infringement, MTV NEWS (May 7, 2003), http://on.mtv.com/1tVAbjq (discussing jury 
award against Dr. Dre for copyright infringement). 
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concept-and-feel”28), effectively allowing them to use their own subjective 
intuitions during the evaluation. Disallowing all expert testimony on the 
question forbids the introduction of any relevant information relating to 
industry practice and the nature of creativity therein.29 Lastly, and perhaps 
most importantly, discouraging summary judgment on the question in an 
effort to have juries make the determination has prevented copyright 
jurisprudence from developing a coherent set of rules and principles that 
might guide the decision, thereby producing a body of decisions that appears 
inextricably ad hoc and arbitrary.30  
The Arnstein opinion itself says very little about its reasons for according 
juries such a central role in what is unquestionably a complex determination. 
What makes this omission in the opinion doubly perplexing is the reality that 
the author of the majority opinion, Judge Jerome Frank, was an outspoken and 
acerbic critic of the jury system.31 A well-known legal realist, Judge Frank 
devoted many hours of his nonjudicial work to criticizing the jury system in 
various books and articles.32 The practice of allowing a jury to decide what was 
in effect “its own ‘law’ in each case” was to Judge Frank among the greatest 
scourges of the American system of adjudication, since it contributed to 
unpredictable “jury-made law,” which often bore no connection to actual rules 
of law.33 Judge Frank’s lifelong distaste for juries and his careful identification 
of the various malaises promoted by the jury system are therefore hard to 
reconcile with the overwhelming confidence in juries that he exudes in 
Arnstein, a confidence that continues to haunt copyright law and practice to 
this day. 
This Article shows that the Arnstein court’s decision to rely on juries for 
the infringement analysis had very little to do with copyright law or policy. 
	
 28. See, e.g., Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 134 
(2d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he total-concept-and-feel locution functions as a reminder that . . . 
infringement analysis is not simply a matter of ascertaining similarity between 
components viewed in isolation.”). 
 29. See Lemley, supra note 3, at 738-40 (describing the problems with the ordinary observer 
framework). 
 30. See id. at 739-40 (noting how the test is impossible to scrutinize on appeal). 
 31. See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 134 (1995) (observing how 
Judge Frank disbelieved in juries completely); Julius Paul, Jerome Frank’s Views on Trial 
by Jury, 22 MO. L. REV. 28 (1957) (analyzing Judge Frank’s critical views on the jury 
system). 
 32. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 108 
(1949) [hereinafter FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL]; JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN 
MIND 170-72 (6th prtg. 1949) [hereinafter FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND]; Jerome 
Frank, Both Ends Against the Middle, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 20, 30 (1951); Jerome N. Frank, 
The Case for the Special Verdict, 32 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 142, 142 (1949) [hereinafter 
Frank, Special Verdict]. 
 33. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note 32, at 120. 
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The Arnstein formulation was hardly a considered decision about the values at 
stake in the copyright infringement analysis but instead almost entirely the 
product of Judge Frank’s well-developed legal philosophy, which led him to an 
approach that minimized the role of lower court judges in the infringement 
analysis and significantly curtailed their ability to rely on issues of law to 
decide cases. Considerations of copyright law were for the most part entirely 
secondary to the court’s decision. While scholars34 (and, on occasion, courts35) 
have criticized the Arnstein court’s analytical framework, hardly anyone has 
examined exactly why the majority opinion chose to go down the road that it 
did.36  
Understanding Arnstein and its legacy requires appreciating the unique 
worldview of the majority opinion’s author, Judge Jerome Frank, who held 
strong views about legal rules and the centrality of facts to adjudication. A close 
reading of the opinions in the case; an examination of the archival memoranda, 
draft opinions, and correspondence between the judges; and an analysis of the 
judges’ various contemporaneous extrajudicial writings tell a complex story 
about the framing of the court’s opinion and its decision to rely on the jury to 
assess the legality of a defendant’s copying. In the end, this story reveals that 
the Arnstein opinion remains a true epitome of legal realism, as famously and 
controversially articulated and advanced by Judge Frank. This reading even 
suggests that Arnstein’s canonical status in copyright jurisprudence may merit 
serious reconsideration. 
Arnstein is today taken to have decided an important substantive rule 
relating to the elements of an actionable copyright infringement claim. In 
actuality, the majority opinion spends little time on copyright principles and 
devotes most of its attention to an important procedural question: the 
appropriate standard for summary judgment. This can be explained by the 
majority’s discomfort with the lower court opinion. The district court in the 
case granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment because the judge 
refused to believe the plaintiff1’s account of the facts.37 In his opinion finding 
	
 34. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 3, at 719 (characterizing the Arnstein court’s analytical 
framework as bizarre); Samuelson, supra note 9, at 1827 (characterizing the Arnstein test 
as “illogical” when applied to particular situations). 
 35. See, e.g., Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1258 n.5 (2d Cir. 1986);  
Denker v. Uhry, 820 F. Supp. 722, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 36. Some have alluded to the issue previously. See GARY A. ROSEN, UNFAIR TO GENIUS: THE 
STRANGE AND LITIGIOUS CAREER OF IRA B. ARNSTEIN 226-27 (2012) (observing that 
writing the opinion put Judge Frank in a “ticklish position” in light of his skepticism of 
juries). 
 37. Arnstein v. Porter, No. 29-754, 1945 WL 6897, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1945), modified in 
part, rev’d in part, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). I use the term Porter in this Article to refer 
to the district court’s opinion to distinguish it from Arnstein, the Second Circuit’s 
opinion, and to emphasize that the defendant prevailed in the lower court. 
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for the defendant, the district court judge specifically alluded to the plaintiff1’s 
prior record of litigiousness and went on to characterize the plaintiff1’s claims 
as “fantastic.”38 To the majority in Arnstein, the district court’s seeming reliance 
on the plaintiff1’s prior filings was highly problematic, since it suggested that 
the judge failed to fully consider the merits of the particular case at hand.39 
What was additionally troublesome to the majority, however, was its intuitive 
sense that the two works at issue shared some level of similarity, as revealed in 
the judges’ private correspondence.40 The majority further felt that this 
intuition necessitated something more than a summary disposal of the case. 
Reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment to ensure that 
this intuition received due attention upon remand required a fair bit of guile. 
Without ever mentioning that his disagreement with the lower court was on 
the facts, Judge Frank devised an approach that would allow his version of the 
facts to be given due consideration. Instead of simply reversing the district 
court and remanding for another possible decision on summary judgment, 
Judge Frank sent the case back to the lower court with specific instructions, 
not only as to whom the factfinder was meant to be (i.e., the jury), but also as to 
the appropriate steps and standards to be employed during the factfinding 
process.41 While the first of these may have been procedurally desirable to 
avoid summary judgment, the second was altogether unnecessary since the 
lower court had not even reached the issue of improper appropriation when it 
granted summary judgment on the question of copying (access).  
Judge Frank thus deftly intermingled both substantive and procedural 
rules, thereby enabling the jury to test his interpretation of the factual record. 
Through such maneuvering, he effected a reversal that was, in the end, purely 
about the facts. But in so doing, he created an all-important copyright law rule: 
determining whether copying is improper is a subjective factual question for 
the jury, rather than a legal question with its own normative standard.   
Arnstein is perhaps a prime example of a hard case making bad law.42 Judge 
Frank’s focus on the procedural aspects of the case in order to ensure the 
plaintiff received a fair hearing muddied the copyright issues at stake by 
suggesting that the decision to involve juries in the copyright infringement 
	
 38. Id. (“I feel warranted in characterizing as fantastic the story on the subject told in the 
plaintiff1’s behalf.”). 
 39. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 475. 
 40. Memorandum from Judge Jerome N. Frank to Judge Charles E. Clark and Judge 
Learned Hand (1Jan. 11, 1946) (on file with the Yale Law School Library); Memorandum 
from Judge Learned Hand to Judge Charles E. Clark and Judge Jerome N. Frank 1  
(1Jan. 18, 1946) (on file with the Yale Law School Library). 
 41. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 469-73. 
 42. See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“Great 
cases like hard cases make bad law.”). 
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analysis was a considered point of copyright law. Indeed, it is for this 
anomalous reason that even though the standard for summary judgment 
enunciated in Arnstein has since been overruled,43 copyright law—relying on 
Arnstein and its rich lineage—continues to accord juries a primary role in the 
infringement analysis. Ironically, in an opinion handed down a mere five days 
after Arnstein, Judge Frank himself illustrated his comfort in making copyright 
infringement determinations without any jury at all, a reality that has gone 
largely unnoticed.44 The court’s procedural maneuverings in Arnstein—
maneuverings designed to grant Ira Arnstein a jury trial—have instead assumed 
a life of their own. 
Appreciating the interwoven factual, procedural, substantive, and 
theoretical issues that were at play in Arnstein sheds new light on its 
importance within the copyright canon. Indeed, it raises the distinct possibility 
that as a principled normative matter—driven by copyright’s utilitarian and 
constitutional goals—there may be little reason to treat all aspects of the 
infringement analysis as purely factual questions for a lay jury. That position 
was driven in large measure by Judge Frank’s legal philosophy, which he 
applied to the facts of the case before him and much of which has since been 
soundly repudiated in American legal thinking. There is thus good reason to 
question the wisdom of continuing to provide juries with primary control over 
the question of infringement in the manner suggested by Arnstein. Scholars 
have over the years voiced their skepticism of the Arnstein two-step test and its 
seemingly naive belief in the competence of lay juries to understand the 
complexities of copyright law.45 Yet few have seriously investigated the 
reasons for this naiveté. A richer understanding of Arnstein’s mistaken legacy 
suggests that it might well be time for courts to seriously revisit and rationalize 
copyright law’s infringement analysis. 
The argument in this Article unfolds in four parts. Part I begins with a 
discussion of Ira Arnstein’s copyright claim against the defendant, Cole Porter, 
and a close reading of the three principal opinions in the case—one from the 
district court and two (the majority and the dissent) from the Second Circuit. It 
closes with a brief discussion of how courts have interpreted and adopted 
Arnstein over the years, illustrating the case’s canonical status in copyright law. 
Part II introduces the legal philosophies and views of the judges who heard the 
case. In it, we see how Judge Frank brought to the case his controversial views 
	
 43. See, e.g., Beal v. Lindsay, 468 F.2d 287, 291 (2d Cir. 1972) (“The rule of Arnstein v. Porter 
that summary judgment may not be rendered when there is the ‘slightest doubt’ as to 
the facts no longer is good law.” (citation omitted) (quoting Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468)). 
 44. Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480, 487-88 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 45. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 3, at 741 (“It is far from clear that juries can do that line-
drawing justice, even with the aid of expert testimony and jury instructions telling 
them to do so.”). 
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about the role of courts, rule skepticism, factfinding in trials, and the 
appropriate use of summary judgment, which played off of the views and 
opinions of the other judges in the case. Part III reconstructs the Arnstein 
opinion against the backdrop of these philosophies and the judges’ own 
archival documents (draft opinions, conference memoranda, and private 
correspondence) to produce a more nuanced and textured image of the case and 
its contributions to copyright law. Part IV then moves to the prescriptive and 
argues that, with the rejection of Judge Frank’s overarching philosophy in 
Arnstein, it may well be time for copyright law to abandon its doctrinaire 
conformity to the Arnstein formulation. 
I. Unbundling Arnstein v. Porter 
The standard for copyright infringement laid down in Arnstein v. Porter is 
today received and understood primarily through attempts by later courts and 
scholars to summarize the majority’s opinion in the case.46 While these 
summaries may be accurate portrayals of the standard itself, they shed little 
light on the precise reasons for the Arnstein majority’s choice of that standard 
and its examination of alternatives. This Part examines the structure and 
reasoning of the different opinions in the case, as well as their interplay. It then 
provides an overview of Arnstein’s canonical status in copyright jurisprudence.  
A. Three Different Opinions 
While Judge Frank’s majority opinion for the Second Circuit remains the 
primary opinion of legal significance in Arnstein, the case itself generated three 
separate opinions, one in the lower court and two on appeal. Besides adopting 
analytically different approaches to the question of copyright infringement, 
the two additional opinions are significant because of the role that each played 
in shaping the principal one. 
1. Judge Caffey and the “fantastic” story 
The story of Arnstein began many years before the plaintiff filed his 
complaint.47 Ira Arnstein was a middle-aged musical composer who, between 
1935 and 1943, commenced five different lawsuits for copyright infringement 
(and likely threatened others) against several well-known composers, music 
	
 46. See, e.g., Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 481-82, 484 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713 (2d Cir. 1992); Concrete Mach.  
Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 608 (1st Cir. 1988); Latman, supra 
note 3, at 1191-96. 
 47. For an extensive account of Arnstein’s litigious career, see ROSEN, supra note 36. 
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publishers, and collection agencies.48 In each of these lawsuits, Arnstein alleged 
that the defendant had plagiarized his work but was unable to prove that any 
of the defendants had copied from it.49 His claims were seemingly motivated by 
what one biographer describes as a deep-seated “persecution complex.”50 
In early 1945, the renowned American composer and songwriter Cole 
Porter became the target of one of Arnstein’s copyright infringement 
lawsuits.51 In his complaint, Arnstein alleged that several of Porter’s famous 
musical compositions had been plagiarized from his own musical works.52 
Appearing pro se, Arnstein sought a jury trial and claimed damages in the sum 
of one million dollars.53 When deposed, Arnstein alleged that the defendant 
had hired stooges to follow him, watch him, ransack his apartment, and even 
live with him in the same apartment.54 Yet he presented absolutely no proof of 
these allegations and, when questioned, maintained that, while he did not 
certainly “know that [Porter] had to do with it,” he knew “that [Porter] could 
have.”55 Since his work had been performed publicly, Arnstein further claimed 
that the defendant had clear access to his music, despite the defendant’s 
categorical denial that he even knew of Arnstein or his music.56 Following 
depositions, the defendant moved for summary judgment. In a fairly short 
memorandum opinion, the district court—Judge Caffey—granted the motion.57 
Despite being presented with evidence of the dissimilarity between the 
plaintiff1’s and defendant’s works, Judge Caffey focused his opinion almost 
entirely on the factual question of actual copying (i.e., whether the defendant 
had actually taken/lifted material from the plaintiff1’s works).58 Relying 
	
 48. These suits included: Arnstein v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 52 F. Supp. 114 
(S.D.N.Y. 1943); Arnstein v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 3 F.R.D. 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); 
Arnstein v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Arnstein v. American Soc. 
of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 29 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); and Arnstein v. Edward 
B. Marks Music Corp., 11 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1935). 
 49. See Twentieth Century Fox, 52 F. Supp. at 114-15; Broad. Music, 46 F. Supp. at 380; Am. Soc. 
of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 29 F. Supp. at 396, 399-401; Edward B. Marks, 11  
F. Supp. at 535-36. 
 50. ROSEN, supra note 36, at xiii. 
 51. Id. at 218. 
 52. Id. at 218-19. 
 53. Id. at 219. 
 54. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1946) (“Plaintiff said that defendant ‘had 
stooges right along to follow me, watch me, and live in the same apartment with me,’ 
and that plaintiff1’s room had been ransacked on several occasions.”). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Arnstein v. Porter, No. 29-754, 1945 WL 6897, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1945), modified in 
part, rev’d in part, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 58. Id. at *1-2.  
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extensively on the parties’ depositions, Judge Caffey concluded that, based on 
“the evidence at the end of the discussion of the principal phase of the pending 
motion, . . . access by the defendant to the plaintiff1’s compositions involved in 
[the] action ha[d] not been proved.”59 In addition, he observed that, based on the 
facts, he felt “warranted in characterizing as fantastic the story on the subject 
told in the plaintiff1’s behalf.”60 
It is important to note that Judge Caffey never reached the issue of 
improper appropriation in any way or form in his opinion. Given the 
plaintiff1’s outlandish allegations and the complete lack of any evidence to 
support them, he saw his focus on actual copying—and the absence of any 
access (by the defendant to the plaintiff1’s works)—to be on fairly solid footing. 
Indeed, he chose to end his opinion with a somewhat curious observation that 
would eventually unsettle Judge Frank on appeal: 
If time were available, I would deal with all the phases concerning each kind of 
relief sought. But my work growing out of the recent motion term is too pressing 
and voluminous to permit me to go further now. I have gathered all the files in 
five cases tried in this court wherein plaintiff sued for judgment in an action 
relating to music or copyrights on musical compositions. The size of the files 
warns me that several weeks would be needed in order to go through all the 
details. I feel bound to go to other cases in which decisions have been reserved.61 
Even by the standards of gratis dictum,62 this observation—in the opinion 
itself—was wholly out of place. It suggests that Judge Caffey was choosing the 
easiest and quickest way to dispose of the case without wanting “to go further.” 
In addition, by referring to the plaintiff1’s prior copyright infringement 
lawsuits, the observation also seemed to suggest that the judge had prioritized 
other cases ahead of the plaintiff1’s principally because of the plaintiff1’s record 
of litigiousness. While every litigant is entitled to have his or her day in court, 
Judge Caffey was suggesting that the plaintiff had already had his, enabling the 
judge to focus on other litigants who were more deserving of the court’s 
attention. Even if the record in this case might have supported Judge Caffey’s 
logic, his reference to the plaintiff1’s prior lawsuits gave his opinion a 
distinctively personal—and therefore partial—dimension. Despite being legally 
sound and, indeed, well grounded in the facts of the case, the candor of the 
opinion unwittingly set in motion a whole series of events and arguments that 
would alter the very course of copyright law. 
	
 59. Id. at *2. 
 60. Id. (emphasis added). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See, e.g., Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Mich. Gaming 
Control Bd., 276 F.3d 876, 881 (6th Cir. 2002) (adopting the Black’s Law Dictionary 
definition of gratis dictum as “a court’s discussion of points or questions not raised by 
the record” (quoting Gratis dictum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999))). 
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2. Judge Frank’s crafty reversal 
Arnstein appealed from the district court’s order to the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals, and the case ended up before a panel consisting of Circuit 
Judges Jerome Frank, Learned Hand, and Charles Clark. Judge Frank authored 
the majority opinion, which Judge Hand joined. Most importantly, the 
majority opinion reversed the district court. Yet it did much more—and it 
remains the primary opinion of legal significance in the case. Its framing, 
emphasis, and reasoning are therefore worthy of serious scrutiny. 
a. Holding 
Fairly early on in his opinion, Judge Frank framed the principal issue in 
the case as a procedural one—“whether the lower court, under Rule 56 
[summary judgment], properly deprived plaintiff of a trial of his copyright 
infringement action.”63 If there was “the slightest doubt as to the facts,” such a 
denial was, to him, problematic.64 The question then turned on whether there 
was indeed the slightest doubt as to the facts at issue. The effect of this framing 
is crucial to appreciate, since it indelibly merged the factual and legal issues 
involved in the case.  
Quite independently of his dislike of juries, Judge Frank was an outspoken 
critic of the then-new summary judgment procedure, precisely because it 
undermined the centrality of facts.65 The very year before Arnstein, he 
authored an opinion admonishing lower courts to “exercise great care in 
granting motions for summary judgment” since “[a] litigant has a right to a trial 
where there is the slightest doubt as to the facts.”66 Arnstein presented Judge 
Frank with a perfect opportunity to deploy the “slightest doubt” standard on 
reversal. 
In the majority’s opinion, answering the factual question (whether there 
was the slightest doubt) required separating out two different parts of the 
infringement analysis—(i) whether the defendant copied from the protected 
work; and (ii) whether such copying, if it were shown to exist, was sufficient to 
constitute improper appropriation.67 On the question of actual copying (i.e., 
step one), the evidence could consist of direct evidence (i.e., the defendant’s 
	
 63. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (footnote omitted). 
 64. Id. (quoting Doehler Metal Furniture Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 
1945)). 
 65. See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary 
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 77 n.21 (1990) (describing Judge Frank as an opponent of 
summary judgment); Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 
1897, 1899 (1998) (describing Judge Frank as one of the procedure’s known critics).  
 66. Doehler Metal Furniture, 149 F.2d at 135.  
 67. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. 
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“admission”) or circumstantial evidence.68 Such circumstantial evidence might 
consist of the defendant’s “access” to the work and the extent of similarity 
between the works themselves (what has since come to be known as “probative 
similarity”69).70 The opinion further details how this circumstantial evidence is 
to be weighted. When there are no similarities whatsoever between the works, 
mere evidence of access, however extensive, cannot be used to prove copying.71 
Conversely, when evidence of access is absent, copying may be presumed if the 
similarities are “striking” and rule out any possibility of independent 
creation.72 When evidence of both (i.e., access and similarity) exists, the 
factfinder is to determine whether they together prove copying, and, for this, 
the finder may rely on expert testimony and a “dissection” of the work.73 All of 
this, to reiterate, goes to the question of actual copying. 
Judge Frank then turned to the second step of the analysis, improper 
appropriation. Improper appropriation is contingent on there being actual 
copying.74 Therefore, if a plaintiff fails to prove actual copying, the jury will 
never reach an improper appropriation analysis. Such improper appropriation 
is to be analyzed based on the response of the “lay hearer,” rendering expert 
testimony and dissection “irrelevant” to the determination.75  
Despite treating the two steps as distinct, the opinion further notes that on 
occasion the same evidence (e.g., similarities) may be used to satisfy both 
elements, even though this is not required and may not always be the case.76 Up 
until this point, Judge Frank’s parsing of the infringement analysis seems to be 
principally in the nature of a digression, since by his own framing the principal 
question was whether there was any doubt as to the facts at issue. The opinion 
then returns to the question of facts and somewhat summarily declares that 
each step of the infringement analysis “is an issue of fact.”77 Nowhere in this 
part of the opinion does Judge Frank tell us why the second step of the 
analysis—improper appropriation—is to be treated as a question of fact, aside 
from the suggestion that this step looks to the response of a “lay hearer.”78   
	
 68. Id. 
 69. Latman, supra note 3, at 1188.  
 70. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. (“If copying is established, then only does there arise the second issue, that of illicit 
copying (unlawful appropriation).” (emphasis added)). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 468-69. 
 77. Id. at 469. 
 78. Id. at 468. 
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Turning to the facts of the case at hand, the opinion then admits that 
“[a]fter listening” to the works involved, the judges signing it (i.e., Judge Frank 
and Judge Hand) found similarities between the works, even though the 
opinion concedes that these similarities would not on their own establish 
copying.79 Yet “[t]he similarities . . . [we]re sufficient so that, if there [were] 
enough evidence of access to permit the case to go to the jury,” the jury could 
“infer that the similarities did not result from coincidence.”80 The district court 
was therefore allowed to rely on summary judgment only if it found without 
doubt that the defendant had no access to the plaintiff1’s work. On the face of 
things, these initial factual observations seem to suggest that, while Judge 
Frank found similarities between the two works, it was still up to the district 
court to decide whether there was “enough” evidence of access to send the 
matter to a jury. However, it is here that the opinion shifts to dispel any notion 
of continued lower court discretion. 
Noting that the lower court judge relied entirely on depositions to 
characterize the plaintiff1’s story as “fantastic,” Judge Frank concluded that the 
judge should have turned the question over to a jury since it was ultimately an 
issue of witness credibility, which was in the end a question of fact.81 The 
plaintiff was to be provided with the opportunity to cross-examine the 
defendant before a jury so as to allow the jury to determine the credibility of 
the defendant’s denials.82 Depositions were disfavored as substitutes for in-
court examinations except when necessity demanded otherwise, which to 
Judge Frank was hardly the situation at hand.83 
Having thus far effectively suggested that most—if not all—copyright 
infringement lawsuits needed to head to a jury, Judge Frank made an effort to 
reiterate that there could be instances where “a trial would be farcical” and 
summary judgment appropriate.84 Since Judge Frank had already emphasized 
the slightest doubt standard, his example of these farcical cases each involved 
instances in which there was, by concession of the parties, no doubt 
whatsoever on the relevant facts, thus making a trial indeed “absurd.”85  
The opinion could have concluded here. It had successfully reversed the 
lower court’s grant of summary judgment owing to the existence of factual 
doubts as to the issue of actual copying. Yet Judge Frank chose to proceed 
further to the issue of improper appropriation. This decision was not without 
	
 79. Id. at 469. 
 80. Id. (emphasis added).  
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. at 469-70. 
 83. Id. at 470. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 470-71. 
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reason, given that Judge Frank wanted to ensure that the case was 
readjudicated on the merits. And it is here that the Arnstein test was developed, 
principally as dicta in the opinion.86 
b. Dicta 
Reiterating that improper appropriation was an issue of fact, Judge Frank 
framed the question as “whether defendant took from plaintiff1’s works so 
much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience 
for whom such popular music is composed, that defendant wrongfully 
appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff.”87 Here, the suggestion 
is that, because copyright is about market protection rather than reputation 
protection, the test should focus on the market effect (i.e., the effect on the 
audience). To reiterate its point, the opinion goes on to note that “[s]urely, then, 
we have an issue of fact which a jury is peculiarly fitted to determine.”88  
But why precisely is this question an “issue of fact”? Whereas the question 
of actual copying is an attempt to ascertain whether an event actually occurred 
and is therefore premised on an epistemic reconstruction of the past, improper 
appropriation is indelibly a normative judgment, even when framed in the 
majority’s own terms. Determining whether enough was taken or whether 
what was taken would be “pleasing” to lay audiences is not only intrinsically 
subjective but also deeply evaluative. Thus, improper appropriation was, in 
Judge Frank’s reasoning, an issue of fact not because of its epistemic quality but 
because of its obvious consequence: adjudication on the merits, which in turn 
required sending it to a jury. In this subtle move, Judge Frank defined a 
category (issue of fact) by its consequence rather than by its underlying 
content, remaining true to his legal realist philosophy.  
Having classified the question of improper appropriation as a factual 
matter, the opinion then makes the startling observation that “after listening 
to the playing of the respective compositions, we are, at this time, unable to 
conclude that the likenesses are so trifling that, on the issue of 
misappropriation, a trial judge could legitimately direct a verdict for 
defendant.”89 This is a somewhat puzzling observation on its face, but it makes 
perfect sense when one considers it in light of Judge Frank’s motivation to 
have the case readjudicated. As a purely analytical matter, Judge Frank of 
course did not have to reach the appropriation question at all. Since the lower 
court had not decided this issue, a remand on the issue of actual copying—with 
	
 86. Samuelson, supra note 9, at 1827. 
 87. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473.  
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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the observation that the court should allow a jury to decide that question—
would likely have been sufficient to provide the plaintiff with a jury trial. All 
the same, this would not have ruled out the possibility that a lower court judge 
could subsequently decide the case at summary judgment on the basis of 
improper appropriation, thereby obviating the need for a jury trial on the first 
step as well, and effectively avoiding the readjudication altogether. Given the 
subjective nature of the inquiry, such a move might have been impossible to 
reverse (or scrutinize) on appeal.  
To prevent this from happening, the opinion had to eliminate the 
possibility of summary judgment on the issue of improper appropriation. 
While the Arnstein court’s statement likely was not meant to eliminate all use 
of summary judgment on the question of improper appropriation,90 it almost 
certainly was aimed at preventing summary judgment on improper 
appropriation in the Arnstein case itself. In other words, the opinion was 
designed to guarantee the plaintiff a jury trial and remove the infringement 
analysis from the trial court judge entirely. By doing so, the court effectively 
entrenched its factual finding of some similarity between the parties’ works. 
Judge Frank then closed the majority opinion with a direct rebuke of 
Judge Caffey’s reliance on the plaintiff1’s prior litigation history.91 As noted 
previously, Judge Caffey used the plaintiff1’s litigation history to explain his 
reluctance to reach the additional issues pressed by the parties. By portraying 
the district court as having either used these records for its own judgment or 
having been improperly (and unconsciously) influenced by them, Judge Frank 
implied that the lower court judge had obviously been biased against the 
plaintiff. In combination, these factors added legitimacy to Judge Frank’s desire 
for a jury trial in the case. 
*    *    * 
The majority opinion in Arnstein is a complex mix of procedure, substance, 
and Judge Frank’s perception of the facts of the case. In it, we see three strands 
of thought. First, its authors (1Judges Frank and Hand) were clearly troubled by 
the existence of some musical similarity between the works. While they were 
unwilling to characterize it as striking, they nonetheless believed that the 
	
 90. Later courts have sequentially interpreted Arnstein in this way. The Ninth Circuit is a 
good example. The Ninth Circuit based its test for substantial similarity on Arnstein.  
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 
1977). A later decision of that court then interpreted the Arnstein-derived holding in 
Krofft to preclude summary judgment altogether on the second step, once the first step 
had been satisfied. See Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1359 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding 
that “satisfaction of the extrinsic test creates a triable issue of fact”).  
 91. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 474-75. 
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similarity might be enough to prove copying if coupled with proof of access. 
Second, it was critical that the case reach a jury for this theory to have any 
chance of producing a favorable outcome for Arnstein. Use of a jury would 
enable a “lay” audience to either confirm or deny the similarity that the 
majority perceived and spell out its legal consequences. Third, for the case to 
reach a jury, the lower court judge’s ability to dispose of the matter either 
through summary judgment or directed verdict had to be minimized (if not 
eliminated). Each of these strands explains a different component of the 
opinion’s reasoning, which together resulted in a reversal of the district court 
and the development of the famous two-part Arnstein test for infringement 
analysis. 
3. Judge Clark’s disbelief 
“[W]e are reversing our own precedents to substitute chaos, judicial as well 
as musical.”92 This observation captures the tone and sentiment of Judge 
Clark’s dissenting opinion in Arnstein. Judge Clark first took issue with the 
majority’s interpretation of the facts in its framing of the appropriate standard 
for copyright infringement.93 His opinion thus notes that “after repeated 
hearings of the records, [he] could not find” the similarity that had caused the 
majority to decide for the plaintiff “to the exclusion of all else, including the 
real issues in the case.”94 According to Judge Clark, while precluding dissection 
and technical analysis on the question of similarity in the second step was 
justifiable, turning that question over to the jury without any guidance on how 
to carry out the analysis made little sense, since “[m]usic is a matter of the 
intellect as well as the emotions.”95 To him, the majority’s standard effectively 
“abolish[ed]” the use of intellect during the analysis insofar as it asked the jury 
to undertake a comparison of the works without any instruction on the 
appropriate manner in which the melodies were to be analyzed.96 
Baffled by the majority’s insistence on a trial even when they themselves 
appeared unconvinced that the plaintiff would succeed, Judge Clark further 
noted that the court’s opinion was “one of those procedural mountains which 
develop where it is thought that justice must be temporarily sacrificed, lest a 
mistaken precedent be set at large.”97 In the dissent’s view, this mistaken 
precedent involved two separate elements: juries and summary judgment.98 On 
	
 92. Id. at 480 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
 93. Id. at 475-76. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 476. 
 96. Id. at 476-77. 
 97. Id. at 479. 
 98. Id. 
Questionable Origins of Copyright Infringement Analysis 
68 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2016) 
810 
 
the use of juries, Judge Clark highlighted an important irony: that while he—
unlike Judge Frank (citing to the latter’s extrajudicial writing99)—was not 
opposed to the use of juries, he did not think the jury was “pre-eminently fitted 
to decide questions of musical values,” which was different from the process of 
ordinary factfinding.100 Characterizing the majority’s insistence on juries for 
the issue of improper appropriation as “premature obiter dictum,” he then 
excoriated the majority for failing to see that it was a mere appellate court, “not 
an administrative or judicial director of the trial courts.”101 Clearly then, Judge 
Clark also saw little rationale for Judge Frank’s characterization of the second 
part of the infringement analysis as a pure question of fact. 
On the issue of summary judgment, Judge Clark’s criticism was even more 
trenchant. Noting that Rule 56 does not make an exception for copyright 
infringement cases, he points out that the slightest doubt standard was mere 
dictum in prior cases and was being surreptitiously converted into a binding 
rule without justification.102 Describing this as a “novel method of amending 
rules of procedure” and as “ad hoc legislation,” the dissent notes that it “subverts 
the plans and hopes of the profession for careful, informed study leading to the 
adoption and to the amendment of simple rules which shall be uniform 
throughout the country.”103 Coming from Judge Clark, one of the architects of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,104 this critique was hardly unexpected. 
What is surprising, however, is that it had little effect on the majority’s own 
discussion or its defense of the standard the court was adopting. 
Judge Clark could not have been more emphatic in his dissent, noting that 
it was ultimately the majority’s perception of some similarity between the 
works that was motivating its entire analysis—procedural and substantive.105 
The dissent ranks among the most acerbic and direct attacks seen in the Second 
Circuit at the time. Somewhat surprisingly, though, it had no influence on the 
majority opinion, which does not even reference the disagreement. 
	
 99. Id. (citing JEROME FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS: SOME ASPECTS OF GOVERNMENT IN A 
DEMOCRACY 80-101 (1942) [hereinafter FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS]; and JEROME 
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 170-85, 302-09, 344-48 (1930)). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 
YALE L.J. 914, 915 (1976) (noting that Judge Clark was “principally responsible” for the 
drafting of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).  
 105. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 475 (Clark, J., dissenting) (“[T]he tinny tintinnabulations of the 
music thus canned resounded through the United States Courthouse to the exclusion of 
all else, including the real issues in the case.”). 
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B. Canonical Status Through Influence 
Despite the majority’s procedural framing of the opinion as revolving 
around the application of Rule 56 to copyright infringement claims,106 it is the 
decision’s substantive analysis of infringement that continues to influence 
modern copyright law. The bifurcation of the analysis into two separate 
steps—actual copying and improper appropriation—and their treatment as 
questions of fact for the jury are today attributed to Arnstein.107 What is crucial 
to appreciate, however, is that Arnstein’s influence on copyright law has had 
little do with its status as binding precedent, especially since its position on the 
availability of summary judgment—i.e., that a slightest doubt on the facts 
necessitated denying a motion for summary judgment—has since been 
expressly overturned.108 Its prominence is instead attributable to the belief that 
the majority’s construction of the infringement analysis represents a workable, 
fair, efficient, and constitutionally compliant process for dealing with 
infringement claims—one that recognizes the “necessarily vague” nature of the 
inquiry involved.109  
A particularly good example of this influence is to be found in the Ninth 
Circuit, which chose to develop its own standard for infringement analysis in 
1977.110 Despite the fact that the Arnstein opinion’s views on summary 
judgment had since been abrogated by later opinions of the Supreme Court as 
well as the Second Circuit,111 the Ninth Circuit nonetheless relied heavily on 
Judge Frank’s logic in developing its “bifurcated test,” basing its own 
framework on the Arnstein doctrine.112 Responding to the defendant’s 
argument that Arnstein’s holding had been overruled, the Ninth Circuit 
nonetheless confidently asserted that Arnstein’s “tests for infringement” were 
	
 106. Id. at 468 (majority opinion). 
 107. See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 23, 3-2 & n.1, § 3:2.1[A] (stating that the 
dominant tests for the analysis stem from the Second and Ninth Circuits, both of 
which based their tests on Arnstein). 
 108. See Beal v. Lindsay, 468 F.2d 287, 291 (2d Cir. 1972) (“The rule of Arnstein v. Porter that 
summary judgment may not be rendered when there is the ‘slightest doubt’ as to the 
facts no longer is good law.” (citation omitted) (quoting Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468)). 
 109. The phrase comes from Judge Learned Hand’s description of the test for copyright 
infringement. See Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 100 F.2d 533, 538 (2d Cir. 1938) 
(Hand, J., concurring) (“The test is necessarily vague and nothing more definite can be 
said about it.”). 
 110. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164-
65 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 111. See First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-90 (1968); Beal, 468 F.2d 
at 291. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit itself recognized that Arnstein’s position on the 
standard for summary judgment had since been “disapproved.” Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1165. 
 112. See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164. 
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“still good law” and followed by courts around the country.113 Much like the 
Arnstein court, the Ninth Circuit—without any reasoning—proceeded to treat 
both steps of the analysis as questions for the jury, even disallowing summary 
judgment on the second step.114 In a largely similar vein, most circuits around 
the country have followed the Arnstein bifurcation model and its reliance on 
juries, albeit with some modifications (none of which touch on these two 
fundamental premises).115  
While courts have on occasion disagreed with the Arnstein framework, 
they have done so primarily within the context of specialized subject matter 
such as computer software, leaving the basic framework largely untouched.116 
Consequently, Arnstein continues to exert a tremendous amount of influence 
on copyright law, limiting the trial judge’s role in the infringement analysis. 
The precise reasons for the endurance of the Arnstein framework—despite 
its nonbinding nature as precedent—remain somewhat unclear. One 
explanation is of course sheer path dependence and the general unwillingness 
of courts to think of a better framework.117 Yet this explanation remains 
somewhat of an oversimplification, given how the framework has proliferated 
among different circuits in the years since. A possible explanation that builds 
on the path dependence story might be found in the fact that the framework 
was developed shortly after the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in 1938. As noted previously, the Federal Rules introduced the 
summary judgment procedure to federal judicial practice for the first time, 
which in turn required courts to begin thinking seriously about bifurcating 
issues before them into questions of fact for juries and questions of law, on 
which they could decide a case entirely on the basis of motions presented to 
them.118 In the midst of this ongoing conversation, i.e., about the separation of 
issues, the Arnstein framework might have had an intuitive appeal, given its 
ready sequencing of the inquiry into two independent steps: one for the jury 
and one for the judge. In this sense, the framework might have come across as 
crafted for the newly reimagined federal judicial practice. In this explanation, 
the path dependence of the framework is exacerbated by its perceived 
	
 113. Id. at 1165. 
 114. Id. at 1164.  
 115. See id. at 1165. 
 116. See, e.g., Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713-15 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 117. For an account of path dependence in the law as an explanation for legal change (and 
nonchange), see Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law1: The Course and Pattern 
of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001). 
 118. For an early discussion of how courts had to confront the law/fact distinction under 
the Federal Rules, see Note, The Law of Fact1: Findings of Fact Under the Federal Rules, 61 
HARV. L. REV. 1434 (1948). 
Questionable Origins of Copyright Infringement Analysis 
68 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2016) 
813 
 
procedural legitimacy under the new Federal Rules. Nonetheless, the 
endurance of the framework over time remains an unsolved puzzle. 
Despite its endurance, scholars have routinely criticized elements of this 
framework,119 and yet Arnstein continues to direct the structure, shape, and 
tone of the infringement analysis. Indeed, the jury continues to occupy an 
exalted place in copyright litigation—prolonging disputes, rendering outcomes 
uncertain, and preventing any rationalization of the law relating to substantial 
similarity—because of Arnstein. Despite Arnstein’s exalted place in copyright 
jurisprudence, scholars have paid little attention to the majority’s reasons for 
favoring the jury in the infringement analysis. 
II. The Legal Philosophies (and Personalities) Involved 
Although the Arnstein dispute involved a complex interplay of procedural, 
substantive, and institutional considerations, the majority opinion says very 
little about why the court chose to treat the entire infringement inquiry as a 
purely factual question, requiring a judge to send the issue to the jury. In 
addition, it provides little justification for treating improper appropriation as a 
purely subjective determination for the jury, where all expert testimony and 
objective evidence is deemed presumptively irrelevant—or, to use Judge 
Clark’s colorful language, as a process which “abolish[es] the use of the 
intellect.”120  
Understanding these crucial aspects of the Arnstein opinion necessitates 
looking beyond the opinions themselves to the views, personalities, and 
judicial philosophies of the judges involved in the case. The appellate court 
panel that heard and decided the appeal in Arnstein consisted of three very 
prominent judges—Jerome Frank, Learned Hand, and Charles Clark—each of 
whom held strong and well-developed views on certain substantive, 
procedural, and structural questions. These views became embedded in the 
opinion’s philosophy. Appreciating the opinion therefore requires an 
understanding of each judge’s contribution to the case. Of course, as the author 
of the majority opinion, Judge Frank certainly brought his own legal 
philosophy to bear most heavily on the reasoning in the opinion. All the same, 
	
 119. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 3, at 738-40 (criticizing the Arnstein-Krofft framework for its 
exclusion of expert testimony from the second step of the analysis; for its use of the 
ordinary observer standard for the comparison with little guidance; and for the 
inability to subject a jury’s decision on the question to judicial review, either on appeal 
or by the trial court judge); Samuelson, supra note 9, at 1825-27 (taking issue with the 
Arnstein framework for its unclear reliance on similarity during both steps of the 
analysis, for putting defendants at an unfair disadvantage by allowing the first step to 
cover proper appropriation, and for failing to recognize that some element of 
copying—i.e., non-independent creation—exists in most new works of expression). 
 120. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 477 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., dissenting). 
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Judge Hand’s decision to support Judge Frank’s opinion, as well as Judge Clark’s 
extensive (and acrimonious) pushback, played no small role in influencing the 
tone and certitude exuded by the majority. 
Using the extensive writings of the three judges on the Arnstein panel, this 
Part provides an overview of their legal philosophies and ideals. In it, we begin 
to see how large swaths of the opinion were determined by Judge Frank’s 
unique worldview, which was only strengthened by Judge Hand’s endorsement 
of its application to the case and Judge Clark’s strident disagreement.  
A. The Legal Realist: Jerome Frank  
Even prior to his appointment to the Second Circuit in 1941, Jerome Frank 
had risen to prominence as a legal thinker, principally for his contributions to 
American legal realism.121 His book Law and the Modern Mind,122 originally 
published in 1930, created ripples through the American legal establishment 
for its contrarian and controversial arguments.123 Described by Walter 
Wheeler Cook as “excit[ing],” “keen, cogent,” and “unique,” the book set out to 
meticulously attack the “basic myth” of certainty that Judge Frank believed 
plagued the American legal system, relying on contemporary advances in 
psychological research.124 Between 1930 and 1953, Judge Frank published a 
large number of additional books and articles developing his critiques of the 
legal and judicial systems even further.125 Towards the latter part of his judicial 
	
 121. See Neil Duxbury, Jerome Frank and the Legacy of Legal Realism, 18 J.L. & SOC’Y 175, 181 
(1991). Originating in the 1930s, legal realism represented a broad movement in the 
American legal academy wherein scholars came to accept the idea that judicial and legal 
reasoning were rarely ever the exclusive product of legal doctrine and other formal 
legal materials. Legal rules and reasoning were instead seen to originate in a variety of 
other sources. For an overview of the core skepticism towards doctrine that 
characterized the movement, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreword1: The Constraint of 
Legal Doctrine, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1843 (2015). For an early account of the movement by 
some of its champions, see L.L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429 
(1934), describing the movement and criticizes some of its tenets; Karl N. Llewellyn, A 
Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930), setting out the core 
tenets of legal realism and developing a prescriptive agenda for it; and Roscoe Pound, 
The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931), developing an account of 
legal realism. 
 122. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, supra note 32. 
 123. See Charles E. Clark, Jerome N. Frank, 66 YALE L.J. 817, 817 (1957) (noting that the book 
“fell like a bomb on the legal world”). 
 124. Walter Wheeler Cook, Law and the Modern Mind1: A Symposium, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 
82, 82-83 (1931). 
 125. For a sample, see FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note 32; FRANK, IF MEN WERE 
ANGELS, supra note 99; Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17 (1931); 
Frank, Special Verdict, supra note 32; Jerome N. Frank, Judicial Fact-Finding and 
Psychology, 14 OHIO ST. L.J. 183 (1953); Jerome Frank, Legal Thinking in Three Dimensions, 
1 SYRACUSE L. REV. 9 (1949); Jerome Frank, Say It with Music, 61 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1948) 
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career, Judge Frank brought together his work and thinking on the 
peculiarities and failings of the judicial process in a book entitled Courts on 
Trial, in which he gave much of his prior realist thinking a distinctively 
judicial dimension.126 
What is perhaps most interesting in Judge Frank’s body of work is his 
articulation of a comprehensive and well-developed account of the litigation 
process, with particular emphasis on judging. His account has both descriptive 
(critical) and prescriptive (constructive) aspects. By the time of his opinion in 
Arnstein, Judge Frank had therefore developed and articulated a particular 
approach to judicial decisionmaking and reasoning, one that he attempted to 
instantiate in that case.  
As with any body of work that spans twenty years, Judge Frank’s writing 
does contain its share of contradictions, inconsistencies, and equivocations.127 
Indeed, in later editions of his early books, Judge Frank himself disavowed 
certain prior positions in an effort to clarify his overall position.128 In addition, 
Judge Frank’s thinking came to focus on different aspects of the legal system 
during the course of his legal career. His work as a scholar differed from his 
writing as a government official, which in turn varied significantly from his 
writing as a Second Circuit judge. Judge Frank’s legal philosophy is therefore 
fairly hard to categorize under any one overarching label. Scholars have even 
tended to treat his views as outliers within legal realism, given how unique and 
distinctive they are in comparison to the work of others ordinarily found in 
that category.129 Without parsing the labels, Judge Frank’s legal philosophy 
may fruitfully be understood as embodying three core ideas, all of which he 
articulated and none of which he repudiated at any point: indeterminacy, 
hunches, and fact skepticism.130 
1. Indeterminacy 
Judge Frank’s identification with other legal realists in the first half of the 
twentieth century is largely attributable to his work on the indeterminacy of 
legal rules in legal and judicial thinking. In Law and the Modern Mind, Judge 
	
[hereinafter Frank, Say It with Music]; Jerome Frank, Words and Music1: Some Remarks on 
Statutory Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1259 (1947); and Jerome Frank, Cardozo and 
the Upper-Court Myth, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 369 (1948) (book review). 
 126. See FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note 32, at vii. 
 127. See, e.g., Duxbury, supra note 121, at 182, 188. 
 128. Id. at 185. 
 129. See, e.g., HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & RETHINKING 
PRIVATE LAW THEORY 3 (2013); Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism1: Toward a 
Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 269 (1997). 
 130. Duxbury classifies Judge Frank’s dominant ideas along similar lines. See Duxbury, supra 
note 121, at 181-86.  
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Frank set out what he believed to be the “basic myth” plaguing the legal system: 
certainty in legal reasoning.131 According to Judge Frank, lawyers, “like the 
laymen, fail to recognize fully the essentially plastic and mutable character of 
law” and mistakenly believe that “rules either are or can be made essentially 
immutable.”132 While he was quick to acknowledge that lawyers are not being 
“consciously deceptive” when they articulate this belief, he took it to be 
pervasive throughout the legal system.133 The consequence of this myth is that 
“demand for exactness and predictability in law is incapable of satisfaction 
because a greater degree of legal finality is sought than is procurable, desirable 
or necessary,”134 which in turn brings the entire legal system into disrepute. 
The primary analytical lesson of the “basic myth” was the recognition that 
legal rules do not, on their own, determine individual cases.135 The process of 
“judging” was not just a rote or mechanistic application of a rule to a set of 
facts, but instead involved actual lawmaking as well. In an effort to avoid 
engaging “incompatible beliefs,” lawyers and judges were seen as routinely 
engaging in the practice of “rationalization,” where they manufactured 
principles to reconcile these beliefs after arriving at a decision.136 Legal rules—
and principles—were, in this understanding, rarely ever a hard constraint on 
legal and judicial thinking. 
Judge Frank’s account of indeterminacy in his early work was fairly 
extreme in its claims that judicial discretion was altogether “unavoidab[le]” and 
at play “in almost all cases.”137 In this, he is commonly seen to have believed in 
what theorists call “global legal indeterminacy,” the idea that law is never 
capable of providing determinate answers.138 While scholars disagree about 
the scope and reach of Judge Frank’s beliefs in indeterminacy,139 it remains 
undisputed that he adhered to a core skepticism about the determinacy of legal 
rules. While this did not mean that judges needed to abandon any and all 
	
 131. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, supra note 32, at 3-12. 
 132. Id. at 9. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 11. 
 135. Id. at 130. 
 136. Id. at 30-31. 
 137. Id. at 362. 
 138. See generally BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL 
REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 10-11 (2007) (classifying and describing 
the various forms of indeterminacy and global indeterminacy). 
 139. Compare Michael Steven Green, Leiter on the Legal Realists, 30 LAW & PHIL. 381, 393 
(2011) (arguing that Judge Frank was not an adherent of global indeterminacy in the 
sense identified by Leiter), with Leiter, supra note 129, at 268-70, 273-74 (making the 
opposite claim and discussing how legal realists were concerned with the 
indeterminacy of litigated cases).  
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reliance on legal rules, it required an understanding and acknowledgement of 
the additional influences on judicial decisions. 
2. Hunches 
Since legal rules were not the primary determinants of judicial reasoning, 
Judge Frank needed to provide an account of how courts do in fact decide 
individual cases. For this he relied on an idea first introduced by Judge Joseph 
Hutcheson around the same time as his own book: the hunch.140 Drawing on 
his experience as a judge, Hutcheson claimed that in deciding a case, a judge 
“wait[s] for the feeling, the hunch—that intuitive flash of understanding which 
makes the jump-spark connection between question and decision, and at the 
point where the path is darkest for the judicial feet, sheds its light along the 
way.”141 Hutcheson further posited that “the judge really decides by feeling, and 
not by judgment; by ‘hunching’ and not by ratiocination.”142 Judge Frank built 
this notion into his account of indeterminacy. Courts “beg[in] with the results 
they desire[] to accomplish” and “work back from conclusions to principles.”143 
Consequently, determining the source of these hunches was, to him, “the key to 
the judicial process.”144 Here we first see Judge Frank disavowing the global 
indeterminacy traditionally attributed to him, for he “concede[s]” that legal 
rules and principles play some role in decisionmaking by suggesting hunches 
and enabling the “judge to check up on the propriety of the hunches.”145 
In Judge Frank’s account, a hunch represents no more than a judge’s 
idiosyncratic and subjective reaction to the facts, circumstances, and context of 
the dispute at hand. Or, as he put it: 
The judge, in arriving at his hunch, does not nicely separate his belief as to the 
“facts” from his conclusion as to the “law”; his general hunch is more integral and 
composite, and affects his report—both to himself and to the public—concerning 
the facts. . . . The judge’s decision is determined by a hunch arrived at long after 
the event on the basis of his reaction to fallible testimony.146 
While the facts of the case usually generate the hunch, those facts are then 
filtered through the judge’s impulsive reactions to them and the judge’s 
	
 140. See Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive1: The Function of the “Hunch” in Judicial 
Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 278 (1929) (detailing the theory of the hunch as the 
“judgment intuiti[on]”). 
 141. Id. at 278 (emphasis added). 
 142. Id. at 285. 
 143. See FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, supra note 32, at 102. 
 144. Id. at 104. 
 145. Id. at 104 n.†. 
 146. Id. at 116. 
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subconscious predispositions to the witnesses and lawyers who present them to 
the court.147 Consequently, hunches are usually hard to determine ex ante.148  
What is important to appreciate, though, is that Judge Frank was at all 
times overtly neutral on the legitimacy of the hunch in judicial 
decisionmaking. Nowhere did he exhort judges to abandon such hunches, nor 
did he seem to believe that their influence might be curbed in any significant 
manner. His only prescription was for lawyers and judges to openly 
acknowledge the influence of such hunches on their thinking, rather than hide 
behind the superficial rationality of legal doctrine.149 
3. Fact skepticism 
Based on his belief in the indeterminacy of legal rules and principles, one 
might readily conclude that Judge Frank was a hardened rule skeptic. Indeed 
many, including the legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart, characterized him as one.150 
Yet the reality remains that Judge Frank’s version of skepticism was far more 
nuanced and indeed fairly unique among his peers. In his version of skepticism, 
we see perhaps the single most distinguishing feature of Judge Frank’s 
philosophy, one that he developed during the latter part of his career from his 
experiences as a judge: fact skepticism. His 1949 book, Courts on Trial, was 
devoted principally to the idea of fact skepticism,151 though we see traces of it 
in his prior work. As we shall see, it was this part of his philosophy that 
influenced his opinion most directly in Arnstein. 
Judge Frank reserved the term “rule skeptics” for scholars who had shown 
that formal legal rules were inaccurate predictors of legal outcomes but who 
nonetheless believed in “greater legal certainty.”152 These rule skeptics, such as 
fellow legal realist Karl Llewellyn, were seen to be looking for some “real rules” 
behind the “paper rules” in their quest for certainty and patterns in the law that 
render it predictable.153 Fact skeptics, on the other hand, begin with a belief in 
the indeterminacy of legal rules but take it one step further on the assumption 
that 
	
 147. Id. at 109-11. 
 148. Id. at 116. 
 149. Id. at 117. 
 150. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 298 n.4 (3d ed. 2012). 
 151. See FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note 32, at 1-156. 
 152. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, supra note 32, at viii. 
 153. Id. For an account of Karl Llewellyn’s version of legal realism, see Frederick Schauer, 
Legal Realism Untamed, 91 TEX. L. REV. 749, 749-51 (2013), which describes Llewellyn’s 
belief that “[j]udges do follow rules, . . . but the rules they follow are often not the ones 
found in standard legal sources.” 
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[n]o matter how precise or definite may be the formal legal rules, . . . no matter 
what the discoverable uniformities behind these formal rules, nevertheless it is 
impossible, and will always be impossible, because of the elusiveness of the facts 
on which decisions turn, to predict future decisions in most (not all) lawsuits, not 
yet begun or not yet tried. The fact skeptics, thinking that therefore the pursuit of 
greatly increased legal certainty is, for the most part, futile—and that its pursuit, 
indeed, may well work injustice—aim rather at increased judicial justice.154 
The fallibility, subjectivity, and structural weaknesses of factfinding in 
trial courts thus motivated Judge Frank’s fact skepticism. In his writing, he 
took the implications of this idea to rather extreme lengths. The intrinsic 
subjectivity of factfinding, to him, meant that to speak of a “legal right” was 
meaningless because, until a court actually ruled on the underlying facts, the 
very existence of such a right was an uninformed guess.155 Since  
[m]ost legal rights turn on the facts as “proved” in a future lawsuit, and proof of 
those facts, in “contested” cases, is at the mercy of such matters as mistaken 
witnesses, perjured witnesses, missing or dead witnesses, mistaken judges, 
inattentive judges, biased judges, inattentive juries, and biased juries. . . . [,] a legal 
right is usually a bet, a wager, on the chancy outcome of a possible future 
lawsuit.156  
Factfinding in trial courts was thus, to Judge Frank, little more than 
guesswork, given the subjectivity inherent in the process. 
As an analytical matter, Judge Frank’s fact skepticism was a natural 
corollary to his belief in legal indeterminacy. Whereas his commitment to 
legal indeterminacy entailed admitting that doctrine rarely ever determined 
outcomes, fact skepticism offered an account of why that was so. Since 
doctrinal propositions rely on findings of fact for their determinacy in 
individual cases, when those facts are themselves subjective and intrinsically 
manipulable, legal doctrine is incapable of ever producing determinate 
outcomes.  
Judge Frank’s fact skepticism drew from structural forces that were well 
engrained in the working of the legal system. The first cause was the 
adversarial system of justice, which to him focused on ensuring a fair “fight” 
between the parties rather than on determining the truth of the matter.157 
Contentious litigation had produced lawyering tactics and strategies that he 
saw as denigrating the value of actual factfinding in courts.158 Second was the 
reality that judges were rarely ever seen as subjective decisionmakers.159 The 
	
 154. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, supra note 32, at ix. 
 155. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note 32, at 26-27. 
 156. Id. at 27. 
 157. Id. at 80. 
 158. Id. at 82-85. 
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legal system had refused to see “[t]hat judges are human and share the virtues 
and weaknesses of mortals,” which had in turn produced a belief in the 
objectivity of judicial factfinding.160 Yet, Judge Frank argued, judges too were 
driven by innumerable “unconscious” and personality-driven influences that 
caused them to rarely “‘find’ the ‘facts’ identically.”161 Judges, much like 
historians, were always engaged in the “unconscious involuntary distortion” of 
facts, even just by virtue of being observers.162  
The third source of Judge Frank’s fact skepticism was also the subject of his 
most trenchant criticism: the jury system.163 Relying on what he dubbed “[t]he 
‘realistic’ theory” of the jury’s function, Judge Frank argued that juries very 
often ignored all legal rules and “determine[d], not the ‘facts’, but the respective 
legal rights and duties of the parties to the suit.”164 Since they were indelibly 
influenced by their own conceptions of justice in the case, juries routinely paid 
little attention to the “law” as such and exercised their “incorrectible power.”165 
All the same, Judge Frank did not believe that the juries were in any sense 
deceptive or malicious. The reason for their functioning in this way was, to 
him, a product of the system’s overarching naiveté: “[C]ourts are obligated to 
make the unrealistic assumption that the often incomprehensible words, 
uttered in the physical presence of the jurors, have some real effect on their 
thought processes.”166 In addition, he saw evidence as routinely presented to a 
jury in a disorderly manner that was “confusing” and produced its own set of 
“obstacles.”167 The net result was that neither the rules of evidence, nor the 
substantive rules of an area, operated as constraints on the jury’s finding of 
facts. This in turn produced what Judge Frank described as “jury-made law,” 
where “each jury makes its own ‘law’ in each case with little or no knowledge 
of, or reference to, what has been done before, or regard to what will be done 
thereafter, in similar cases.”168 
To Judge Frank, the jury system was clearly “undesirab[le].”169 
Nevertheless, he recognized that, as a judge committed to protecting the 
Constitution and enforcing statutory provisions, he was obligated to preserve 
	
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 150-52. 
 162. Id. at 156 (quoting Henri Berr & Lucien Febvre, History, in 7 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE 
SOCIAL SCIENCES 357, 367 (Edwin R.A. Seligman ed., 1932)).  
 163. Id. at 108.  
 164. Id. at 111. 
 165. Id. at 113. 
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the jury’s role in the adjudicative process.170 This obviously put him in an 
awkward position when advocating for juries in different contexts. He 
therefore made a somewhat halfhearted effort to offer suggestions for 
reforming the jury system, recognizing that it was unlikely to go away any 
time soon.171 All the same, if one understands his dislike for juries as forming 
but one part of his overall philosophy of fact skepticism, it begins to allow for 
some leeway in evaluating his occasionally favorable treatment of juries. As we 
shall see, this became an issue in Arnstein. 
*    *    * 
While Judge Frank is commonly labeled a legal realist, this 
characterization is at best imperfect. What really characterized his thinking 
was his belief that it was in the vicissitudes of the factfinding process that the 
legal system actually functioned and served to realize justice. His fact 
skepticism was more than just an abstract philosophy. It informed much of his 
judicial reasoning on what appeared to be core substantive and procedural 
issues, often giving them an underappreciated gloss. As we shall see, Judge 
Frank’s commitment to fact skepticism coupled with his general distrust of 
factfinding by lower court judges were in the end principally responsible for 
the copyright infringement analysis that he formulated in Arnstein. 
B. The Copyright Expert: Learned Hand 
The second member of the panel in Arnstein was none other than Judge 
Billings Learned Hand, described by some as “the greatest judge to never sit on 
the Supreme Court.”172 While on paper his primary contribution to the 
opinion was in joining Judge Frank’s majority opinion, his very presence on 
the panel that decided the case is of some significance. Some of his most 
significant contributions to copyright jurisprudence in the decades preceding 
the case came to influence the Arnstein formulation. During his time on the 
bench—both as a district court judge and later as a circuit court judge—Judge 
Hand authored innumerable opinions on a wide variety of critical copyright 
law issues. Gerald Gunther, in his biography of Judge Hand, observed that “[n]o 
area displays Hand’s superlative traits as a judge more richly than his work in 
copyright law.”173 Understanding Judge Hand’s judicial philosophy, and indeed 
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his overall approach to copyright law, is largely orthogonal to our inquiry here 
except for one important area where he had a lasting impact: the test for 
copyright infringement. 
Even as a district court judge, Judge Hand came to recognize the imprecise 
and subjective nature of the copyright infringement inquiry. Especially in 
relation to musical works, his opinions often focused on the melodic 
component of a work, which he believed endowed the work with its 
commercial and popular significance.174 Consequently, for copying to be 
actionable, the melody itself needed to be copied, regardless of how extensive 
other copying was. In Hein v. Harris, which he decided in 1910, Judge Hand 
found that the defendant infringed the plaintiff1’s musical score, even though 
there were differences of some significance between the works.175 He observed 
that even though “the keys [we]re different . . . this [wa]s a distinction which 
[wa]s of no consequence to the ears of all but those especially skilled in 
music.”176 In Hein, Judge Hand also set out his basic approach to balancing 
creativity and copying in the world of musical copyright: 
[T]he right of the author of a musical composition is not affected by the fact that 
he has borrowed in general from the style of his predecessors. The collocation of 
notes, which constitutes the composition, becomes his own, even though strongly 
suggestive of what has preceded, and it ceases to be an invention, and becomes an 
infringement, only when the similarity is substantially a copy, so that to the ear 
of the average person the two melodies sound to be the same. Therefore the lack 
of originality and musical merit in both songs, upon which the defendant insists, 
is of no consequence in law. While the public taste continues to give pecuniary 
value to a composition of no artistic excellence, the court must continue to 
recognize the value so created. Certainly the qualifications of judges would have 
to be very different from what they are if they were to be constituted censors of 
the arts.177 
In this paragraph, we observe three points of significance. The first is 
Judge Hand’s observation that even a work of low artistic (i.e., musical) 
excellence can qualify for copyright protection. Here we see an echo of Justice 
Holmes’s famous observations in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.178 
Second is the idea that something is a copy only when it is “substantially” the 
same as the original, measured by the average listener’s reaction to the melodies 
in the two works. Third is his rationalization that this method most accurately 
measures the public taste in music, which gives the work its pecuniary value. 
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Judge Hand’s focus on the melody came to be called the “comparative 
method” of analysis and was soon applied widely.179 A few years later, it was 
Judge Hand who also introduced the requirement of “access” into the first step 
of the infringement analysis, i.e., that the availability of the protected work 
was a sine qua non for copying to be proved as a factual matter.180 In Haas v. Leo 
Feist, Inc., he was willing to find such access based on the testimony of the 
parties and upon his personal “musical sense,” which he employed to detect 
similarities.181 “[D]erivation” needed to be independently proved.182 In 
subsequent unreported decisions, he even went one step further, observing that 
mere similarity without access could not amount to an infringement.183  
As a district court judge, Judge Hand also applied his approach to the 
comparison of literary works, specifically to plays and motion pictures. In 
Stodart v. Mutual Film Corp., the plaintiff alleged that two motion picture 
companies had plagiarized his play in their movies.184 Working through the 
plot, incident, characters, storyline, and scenes of the work, Judge Hand 
concluded that there was indeed an infringement. Echoing his observation in 
Hein, he went on to note:  
A man may take an old story and work it over, and if another copies, not only 
what is old, but what the author has added to it when he worked it up, the 
copyright is infringed. It cannot be a good copyright, in the broader sense that all 
features of the plot or the bare outlines of the plot can be protected; but it is a 
good copyright in so far as the embellishments and additions to the plot are new 
and have been contributed by the copyright.185 
In this observation, we see the early outline of what would come to be 
understood as analytic “dissection” during the infringement analysis—the idea 
that a protected work might contain both protected and unprotected material, 
which a judge or jury would be required to parse. 
Judge Hand’s lasting impact on copyright jurisprudence, however, came 
during his tenure on the Second Circuit, by which time he had already spent 
several years developing his judicial philosophy on copyright. His 1930 opinion 
in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.186 is credited with explaining the logic 
behind copyright’s test for infringement. The case involved a plaintiff who 
alleged that her play had been infringed by the defendant’s “motion picture 
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play,” which had a similar storyline and setup.187 Judge Hand began his analysis 
with the observation that for “any protection of literary property, whether at 
common-law or under the statute, . . . the right cannot be limited literally to the 
text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations.”188 This in turn 
meant that “when the plagiarist does not take out a block in situ, but an 
abstract of the whole, decision is more troublesome.”189 He then went on to 
describe the approach in a paragraph that has since been quoted innumerable 
times and has acquired iconic status as the “abstractions” principle in copyright 
law: 
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of 
increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left 
out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what 
the play is about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in 
this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the 
playwright could prevent the use of his “ideas,” to which, apart from their 
expression, his property is never extended. Nobody has ever been able to fix that 
boundary, and nobody ever can.190  
In the end, after a detailed analysis of the plays, he went on to conclude 
that the defendant’s copying was “no more . . . than the law allowed,” rendering 
it noninfringing.191 Judge Hand’s reasoning in Nichols is special, not merely 
because of its “brilliant”192 analysis but also because of its candid admission that 
the infringement analysis in copyright law is necessarily imprecise and heavily 
contextual. Perhaps more importantly, in applying the test to the facts before 
him, Judge Hand vividly illustrated how courts were to look past strong 
similarities between the works when they related to unprotectable elements.  
A few years after Nichols, Judge Hand applied the same logic to a different 
set of facts and came to the exact opposite conclusion. In Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures Corp., Judge Hand noted that “others may ‘copy’ the ‘theme,’ or 
‘ideas,’ or the like, of a work, though not its ‘expression’” and emphasized that 
“unconscious plagiarism is actionable quite as much as deliberate” plagiarism 
even if creators “might quite honestly forget what they took.”193 Judge Hand’s 
recognition of the contextual nature of the infringement inquiry was thus 
more than just rhetoric, as revealed in his own application of its reasoning to 
future cases. Nichols continues to influence copyright law to this day, with 
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courts most recently extending its application to the realm of computer 
software,194 which copyright law treats as a literary work. 
By 1946, when Arnstein was argued before the Second Circuit, Judge Hand 
had therefore established himself as the nation’s leading judge on copyright 
law. Indeed, it would only be a slight exaggeration to say that the basic 
approach to copyright infringement, including the concepts of “substantial” 
similarity, access, and dissection, were essentially his very creations, since he 
had by then “creatively shaped the law.”195 Additionally, as some scholars have 
noted, Judge Hand’s copyright opinions reveal a rhetorical flourish and 
“virtuos[ity]” that “convey the sense that he enjoyed deciding them.”196 His 
decision to allow Judge Frank to author the majority opinion in Arnstein and to 
lend his imprimatur to it was therefore of some considerable significance in the 
case. 
C. The Procedural Reformer: Charles Clark 
The final member of the Arnstein panel, who authored the powerful 
dissent in the case, was Judge Charles E. Clark. A prominent scholar of civil 
procedure, Judge Clark was a tenured member of the Yale Law School faculty 
who went on to serve as the law school’s dean.197 Before being appointed to the 
bench, Judge Clark had also held an important reform-related position that 
would come to color much of his judicial writing: Reporter to the Supreme 
Court’s Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure.198 In that position, 
he was “principally responsible for the drafting of the Federal Rules,” which 
came into effect in 1938,199 and many of his contemporaries noted how the 
Rules bear the indelible imprint of his core philosophy.200 Scholars have long 
observed how his judicial opinions were greatly influenced by his work on the 
Advisory Committee and that they were characterized by a “passion[ate] and 
fervent devotion” to the Federal Rules, to the work of the Committee, and in 
particular to Rule 56 dealing with summary judgment, which Judge Clark had 
personally helped draft.201 
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As a scholar of civil procedure, Judge Clark articulated his basic 
philosophy in that area in an article published a few years before he became a 
judge: The Handmaid of Justice.202 In it, he emphasized that procedure was meant 
to have a subordinate position to substantive rules of law, as a handmaid rather 
than a mistress, and that procedural rules were to be characterized by 
efficiency, simplicity, regularity, and flexibility (adaptability to new 
circumstances).203 As some have noted, Judge Clark failed to fully appreciate 
how these ideals might themselves compete with one another on occasion in 
practice.204 Judge Clark’s belief that procedure should not dictate outcomes in 
individual cases was more than just lofty rhetoric, however; it represented a 
worldview that was decidedly antiformalist and anticonceptualist. In an 
illuminating work that draws on Judge Clark’s papers, David Marcus argues 
that this strand of Judge Clark’s thinking was distinctively pragmatic in 
outlook and content, insofar as it associated the legal system with goals derived 
from individual substantive areas and abjured any reliance on procedural 
foundationalism.205  
Judge Clark was an early and influential legal realist who recognized that 
there was an important role for legal rules in the processes of legal and judicial 
reasoning.206 Some of his early work openly criticized the American Law 
Institute’s first round of restatements, arguing that they were attempting to 
mechanically restate the law in “black letter” terms, without appreciating the 
unique contexts and circumstances from which the law itself emerged.207 In 
Judge Clark’s view, procedural legal rules needed to be “stated in the terms of 
the functions they are to perform, or the results they are to achieve, rather 
than as arbitrary mandates” or principles.208 They were useful insofar as they 
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worked as “guiding principle[s]” that were workable in practice.209 Judge Clark 
was thus decidedly functionalist about procedural rules and very willing to 
recognize that in the hands of a good judge, procedure facilitated a genuine 
focus on the substantive issues at stake in an efficient and speedy manner. 
Despite being responsible for the entirety of the Federal Rules, Judge Clark 
undoubtedly felt most strongly about Rule 56—summary judgment.210 As a 
scholar and later Reporter for the Federal Rules, Judge Clark believed that 
summary judgment was an “effective remedy” for the problem of the “law’s 
delay.”211 He believed that its virtues were in its “simplicity” and in its “prompt 
disposition of bona fide issues of law as well as of sham defenses” when there 
were no material disputes of fact.212 To Judge Clark, summary judgment 
enabled litigants to avoid the perils of a full trial merely to establish that the 
case had no merit. He thus viewed trials as arduous mechanisms that needed to 
be reserved primarily for situations where facts—and not the law—formed the 
principal locus of disagreement. As he put it, midway into his judicial career, by 
which time scholars had highlighted several problems with courts’ use of the 
summary judgment procedure: 
It is obvious that judges should be careful not to grant judgment against one 
who shows a genuine issue as to a material fact. Just as obvious is the obligation to 
examine a case with care to see that a trial is not forced upon a litigant by one 
with no case at all. The very freedom permitted by the simplified pleadings of the 
modern practice is subject to abuse unless it is checked by the devices looking to 
the summary disclosure of the merits if the case is to continue to trial. . . . Refusal 
of summary disposal of the case may be a real hardship on the more deserving of 
the litigants; since appeal does not lie from refusal, as it does from the grant, the 
penalties may be the severer. A court has failed in granting justice when it forces a 
party to an expensive trial of several weeks’ duration to meet purely formal 
allegations without substance fully as much as when it improperly refuses to hear 
a case at all.213 
In Judge Clark’s view, an erroneous denial of summary judgment was perhaps 
worse than an erroneous grant, since the denial was nonappealable and 
obligated the parties to undergo a prolonged trial. Minimizing the judicial 
system’s use of trials was, to him, an obvious way of reducing delays and 
ensuring speedy justice in civil cases. 
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Greater reliance on the summary judgment procedure by trial courts, 
however, required a good degree of confidence in the facts of the case. As Judge 
Clark himself acknowledged, summary judgment was appropriate only when 
there was no “genuine” issue of material fact. To many at the time, the distance 
between no issue of material fact and a clear dispute of fact was rather 
significant. Judge Clark’s support for summary judgment—as articulated in his 
writing—appeared to advocate denials of summary judgment only when there 
was a clear issue of fact, enabling judges to summarily dispose of cases in 
situations involving the rest of the spectrum. His logic was that in such “cases 
where no sharp dispute on the facts is uncovered, determination of the case 
may well turn upon adjudication of a serious issue of law.”214 In other words, 
when the factual disputes were not “sharp” or distinctive, the dispute usually 
involved an issue of law.215 Judge Clark’s approach was therefore premised on 
instilling an approach of factual certitude in lower court judges, enabling them 
to retake their place in the development of the law. Judge Clark’s views on 
summary judgment therefore went hand in hand with his realist belief that 
judges are primarily engaged in “the creative job of making new law.”216 All the 
same, his views were premised on a degree of confidence about the factfinding 
process and the ability of judges to discern factual disputes (and nondisputes) 
that was, as a logical matter, radically opposed to Judge Frank’s fact skepticism. 
Judge Clark’s support for summary judgment both drew from and 
augmented his lack of confidence in juries. In this respect, he shared Judge 
Frank’s views, except that, as a pragmatic thinker, his views were driven less 
by theory and rhetoric and more by a reformer’s outlook. In a 1934 empirical 
study of civil juries in Connecticut, he carefully reviewed the working of jury 
trials in the state—casting to the side his own views on the subject.217 When 
evaluating the data, he offered the following observation: 
Whatever the political, psychological or jurisprudential values of the jury as an 
institution may be, its use in the civil litigation covered by this study is certainly 
not impressive. The picture seems to be that of an expensive, cumbersome and 
comparatively inefficient trial device employed in cases where exploitation of the 
situation is made possible by underlying rules.218 
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Besides being a hardened legal realist and a pragmatic thinker, there was a 
third—and perhaps more visible—component to Judge Clark’s worldview. This 
was his longstanding professional animosity towards his colleague Jerome 
Frank. The precise source (and psychological roots) of this conflict has baffled 
scholars for many years now.219 Both individuals were prominent, published 
legal scholars prior to their judicial appointments, and both were “New 
Dealers” and legal realists who shared similar political and institutional 
values.220 Yet their disagreement on the court was legendary. The historian 
Marvin Schick describes “the virtually uninterrupted friction” between the 
two as one of the “outstanding feature[s] of the court’s work” during the 
decade.221 Judge Frank would openly acknowledge this acrimony in his 
letters,222 but neither was able to dispense with it in any significant form. In 
multiple legal opinions, Judge Frank mocked Judge Clark’s views on the 
Federal Rules by making witty references to Judge Clark’s characterization of 
procedure as “the ‘hand-maid’ of justice.”223 This only caused Judge Clark to 
become more defensive in both his writing and his positions.  
The Clark-Frank feud was sufficiently public and well known that other 
judges at the court (and beyond) were often aware of it.224 In one 
memorandum, Judge Hand chided them, stating, “After you and Jerry [Judge 
Frank] . . . stop shouting, for God’s sake file the opinions.”225 In other writings, 
Judge Hand was even more overt in his identification (and criticism) of this 
feud.226 Whatever may have caused this animosity—whether it was the reality 
that Judge Clark commuted from New Haven and was not a permanent 
presence in New York (unlike Judge Frank),227 Judge Clark’s own intellectual 
insecurities,228 Judge Frank’s style of argumentation,229 Judge Hand’s seeming 
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endorsement of Judge Frank on most issues,230 or Judge Clark’s own 
pugnaciousness231—the fact of the matter remains that it influenced both the 
jurisprudence of the court and Judge Clark’s philosophy and outlook on a 
number of issues. When Judge Frank authored a majority opinion, Judge Clark 
invariably felt the need to dissent and vice-versa. In the ten-year period 
between 1941 and 1951, the two were on opposite sides in fifty-eight appeals.232 
Arnstein fell into this category. 
In a tribute to Judge Frank wherein Judge Clark described this conflict, 
Judge Clark described their confrontations as “glorious battles” and 
characterized Judge Frank as “a gladiator of unusual power and adroitness.”233 
In the end, though, Judge Clark attributed the disagreements to his own views 
on procedural reform, noting:  
If we differed, he and I, it tended to be here, where he felt that my aspirations for a 
uniform procedure, impartial as to all, were likely to rest heavily on some poor 
person not prepared therefor, and that such a person must be protected, whatever 
future inconsistencies might come back to trouble us.234 
In summary, then, much of Judge Clark’s legal and judicial thinking was 
heavily influenced by his work on the Advisory Committee and his 
commitment to the Federal Rules. In this role, he felt fairly sanguine about a 
lower court’s ability to manage the issues involved, once presented with the 
right procedural mechanisms. To Judge Clark, the overarching ideal of the 
judicial system was the administration of justice, for which the systematization 
and streamlining of the process were essential steps in order to facilitate the 
court’s focus on substance. Indeed, Judge Clark felt so strongly about his 
commitment to the Federal Rules that in a letter to Judge Hand he candidly 
recognized the conflict: 
The truth of the matter is that I sometimes find difficulty in my two capacities of 
judge and of reporter for the rules. It is hard to know where to draw the lines. . . . 
Maybe the two jobs will become more and more fundamentally incompatible. . . . 
Maybe I ought to resign from the Committee . . . .235 
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Whether or not Judge Clark’s position compromised his judicial role, the fact 
remains that the Federal Rules represented his professional “bab[y].”236 
III. Orchestrating the Reversal 
Having examined the actual opinions in Arnstein as well as the background 
legal philosophies and beliefs of the panel members that heard the case, this 
Part aims to reconstruct how—and perhaps more importantly why—Judge 
Frank structured the opinion in the way he did and, in the process, produced 
new copyright doctrine: the Arnstein test. To this end, this Part relies not only 
on the judges’ extrajudicial writings, but also on their relevant correspondence, 
memoranda, and draft opinions in the case, which, together with the published 
opinions, provide a richer account of the motivations for the Arnstein 
formulation. This reading indelibly confirms that despite Judge Frank’s 
extensive efforts to avoid creating “bad precedent,” his opinion succeeded in 
doing just that, owing to the rationalized and iconoclastic way in which it was 
constructed. 
Understanding Arnstein through the judges’ correspondence and 
memoranda provides a unique window into the way in which the judges in the 
case conceived of the workings of the copyright system and the role of 
litigation therein. Indeed, their memoranda in the case are more than just ex 
post explanations for their views and decisions. The memoranda represent the 
very process through which they reasoned to arrive at their votes and 
conclusions in Arnstein. At the time, the Second Circuit adhered to a rather 
unique practice. The judges who heard a case met in conference to discuss their 
views an entire week after the oral arguments, during which time they were 
expected to indicate how they planned to vote through the mutual exchange of 
written memoranda.237 While the process was no doubt laborious for the 
judges themselves (and often criticized238), it nonetheless ensured that their 
memoranda were candid instruments of persuasion and reasoning that today 
contain a wealth of hidden detail about the disposition of a case. This was 
indeed true of Arnstein, where the judges generated a rich paper trail that sheds 
light on what Judge Frank intended to achieve with his opinion, in contrast to 
what actually became of it over time. 
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A. Divergent Musical Hunches and Procedural Sensibilities 
Arnstein was argued before the Second Circuit in the week of January 7, 
1946,239 and in keeping with the court’s protocols at the time, the judges 
scheduled their conference for the following week. A few days after oral 
argument, on January 11, Judge Frank was the first to weigh in.240 Noting that 
there were good occasions for summary judgment in copyright infringement 
cases, he argued that this was “not such a case.”241 The crux of the matter, in his 
view, boiled down to this: “I have listened to [both musical compositions]. I am 
relatively unversed in this field. But I think that . . . Porter’s [composition] has 
some marked resemblances to . . . Arnstein’s . . . . So, too, does my secretary who 
improvises music.”242  
His own auditory sensibilities therefore urged him to conclude that the 
plaintiff, Ira Arnstein, was “entitled to a trial.”243 Judge Frank then sought to 
underplay the plaintiff1’s seemingly fantastical allegations, noting how “partly 
crazy men” could still be victims of plagiarism, especially since the plaintiff1’s 
works “show considerable ability.”244 He concluded his initial memo with a jibe 
at the district court, noting that the size of the case files appeared to “have 
induced [Judge Caffey] not to study with care the facts in this case.”245  
Three days later, Judge Clark responded with his own memorandum—
significantly longer than Judge Frank’s.246 In it, he noted that he “first went 
over the sheet music” to study the plaintiff1’s “dissection-analysis” and 
concluded that there was no copying.247 He then claimed to have met with his 
friend Luther Noss, a “Yale University organist” who “played and sang all the 
pieces.”248 Noss concluded that the plaintiff1’s claims were “fantastic” and that 
the defendant’s comparison (which showed the extensive differences) was more 
accurate.249 Judge Clark’s point was simple: as a composer of simple “musical 
idioms,” the plaintiff had been able to find similarities with much of the 
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defendant’s work, disregarding “the melodies which impress the public.”250 
Arnstein could never, in Judge Clark’s view, “get any expert to support his 
thesis.”251 Judge Clark appears to have genuinely believed that he could 
persuade Judge Frank with his analysis, noting “had you been with me or if you 
now do the same thing with a really good musician you will not have the 
slightest doubt that there is nothing to this at all.”252 His use of the phrase 
“slightest doubt” is interesting here, since he might have been implying that 
even under Judge Frank’s preferred standard for summary judgment (the 
slightest doubt standard253), the plaintiff simply had no case. 
Yet Judge Clark could not bring himself to stop there. His commitment to 
the Federal Rules got the better of him, and he chose to point out that Judge 
Frank was reversing the lower court’s grant of summary judgment, which was 
quite independently a bad thing. Expressing his “considerable dismay” at the 
court’s tendency to “do damage to the rule of summary judgment against its 
wording and its spirit,” he believed that it would do no more than “redouble the 
energies of the lawyers to go back to the old system” of pleading.254 This was a 
reference to the system of code pleading that existed prior to the introduction 
of the Federal Rules, a topic that Judge Clark had written about previously.255 
Judge Frank seems to have found no merit in this allegation, for in his version 
of the memo he merely underlined this observation and inserted by its side in 
pencil: “Why?”256   
The only benefit of a full trial, in Judge Clark’s view, was to elicit expert 
testimony, which could have been obtained by affidavit or by the court 
consulting a musical expert of its own. He then brought the point home rather 
forcefully: 
I don’t believe one of us thinks for a moment that there is one chance out of a 
hundred of Arnstein’s ever succeeding here; and I think we cast doubt on the 
process of justice and our own standing as a court if we simply postpone decision 
and have not the backbone to stop it when we should. . . . I think it brings the 
whole process of justice and our own court in particular into disrepute.257 
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Judge Clark’s memo was simultaneously powerful and distracting. While 
it forcefully presented the virtues of expert analysis, his emphasis on the 
procedural issue at stake, i.e., summary judgment, gave the case an unduly 
personal dimension—and took the exchange in a new direction. Indeed, in its 
reference to the court’s lack of “backbone,” the memo suggested to Judge Frank 
that the entire basis of his reversal was borne out of a dislike for summary 
judgment and the “weakness” of indecision. An acrimonious back-and-forth 
was thus inevitable. And while the judges continued to vocalize their 
procedural disagreement, they never again explored their factual (i.e., musical) 
disagreement, which was the real root cause of their disagreement in the case. 
In his rejoinder, produced the very next day, Judge Frank took Judge 
Clark’s cue and shifted his focus almost entirely to the procedural issue, noting 
that Judge Clark’s memo seemed to be driven by his belief that inroads into 
summary judgment “offend[ed] against the basic principles of enlightenment in 
procedure.”258 He claimed to be “impressed” by the plaintiff1’s pro se 
representation, noting that summary judgment would put him “at a 
disadvantage.”259 Judge Frank also asserted that a trial would have been quick:  
The defendant would have introduced the very evidence it has put in by way of 
affidavits; the defendant would have testified; then the trial judge would have 
done the work which he obviously didn’t do here, and, on appeal, we would have 
been obliged to do far less work than defendant asks us to do on this appeal.260 
The next sentence in the memo is quite telling, for it clearly reveals that Judge 
Frank’s real discomfort with the lower court decision arose from his 
uncertainty about the facts involved. In this sentence, Judge Frank poignantly 
observed that “[t]o say that plaintiff1’s case will be no stronger on a trial is to 
guess.”261 To Judge Frank, this was simply unacceptable.262  
Somewhat interestingly, in a version of the memo circulated internally, 
Judge Frank scribbled a few handwritten thoughts in the side margin. In one, 
he asks the question, “Would we sustain a directed verdict here, if this had been 
a jury trial?”; in the other, he appears to make an observation about how 
copying might be inferred when he writes: “(1) If no direct proof of access 
whatsoever, still marked similarity may be proof of it[;] (2) If no such marked 
similarity, then there must be some direct proof of copying.”263 It is not clear if 
these thoughts represent Judge Frank’s efforts to muddle through the standard 
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or if they were put in later. Neither made its way into the memo sent out, 
though the latter became the Arnstein standard for proof of copying in the 
opinion itself. Judge Frank concluded his memo with the claim that he was 
opposed to “creating a bad precedent” merely because “Arnstein is nutty.”264 
Much as Judge Frank’s second memo shifted gears towards a critique of 
summary judgment, so too did Judge Clark’s next salvo, dated the same day as 
Judge Frank’s missive.265 Indeed, Judge Clark’s memo took the disagreement in 
a more ad hominem direction. Claiming that Judge Frank had sidestepped his 
“musical analysis,” Judge Clark chided Judge Frank for suggesting that the 
court should do “less work,” quipping that he thought they “were here to 
work.”266 Judge Clark then interpreted Judge Frank’s reference to “bad 
precedent” as suggesting a precedent where summary judgment was allowed in 
an infringement trial and reiterated that it was the court’s “duty to apply the 
rule [i.e., summary judgment], and let the precedents fall as they may.”267 It is 
not clear that Judge Frank’s reference to “precedent” was singularly connected 
to summary judgment, but Judge Clark certainly took it to be. 
Judge Frank responded the next day, this time with his own ad hominem 
critique of Judge Clark.268 He first clarified that his reference to less work was 
merely a reference to the appellate court “doing the job of the trial court.”269 
His memo then went on the offensive, accusing Judge Clark of secretly 
“call[ing] in an expert witness” and of asking the court to decide the case based 
on “that witness’ testimony.”270 Explaining why it would be improper and 
unfair to do so, Judge Frank even argued that “judicial notice” of the matter was 
inappropriate for such analysis when the party against whom it was being used 
was not given the opportunity to rebut it.271 The memo then referred back to 
the “bad precedent” claim, and here—in what appears to be a direct taunt—
consciously affirmed Judge Clark’s interpretation of it. Judge Frank thus 
unequivocally claimed that summary judgment was “‘bad’ here” and that 
nothing was wrong with the desire to avoid a bad precedent.272 Referring to 
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Judge Clark’s “fondness for summary judgments” as potentially “infect[ious],” 
the memo insisted that the procedure be “carefully restricted.”273 
Note that Judge Hand had yet to weigh in with his views on the case, even 
though Judge Frank and Judge Clark had by this time circulated five 
memoranda. On January 18, a whole week after Judge Frank’s first memo in 
the case, Judge Hand finally weighed in and sided with Judge Frank.274 Judge 
Hand began his memo with the observation that the case had “troubled [him] 
more than anything else of the week’s batch.”275 Arguing that the “main 
question is of infringement,” he concluded that there “ought to be a trial.”276 His 
reason: “[S]o far as my ear is the test, I cannot say that, if the defendant did use 
the plaintiff1’s songs, it was not actionable,” especially since “we ought not to 
substitute ourselves as a jury on such an issue” because in the end “[t]he test is 
the impression made upon the ear of the ordinary hearer,” an issue which 
should be “exclusively for a jury.”277 What is ironic in Judge Hand’s 
observation here is that, in the preceding paragraph, he had observed that “it is 
extremely improbable that the defendant could ever have heard [the plaintiff1’s 
music], or that, if he had, he should have copied it.”278 “[N]o jury is likely to . . . 
believe that the defendant got any benefit from it, if it happened.”279 Judge 
Hand was therefore willing to send the case to a jury hoping to get to illicit 
copying even though he had little doubt that there was no actual copying at all. 
Much like Judge Frank, Judge Hand too appears to have been moved by the 
musical similarities that he perceived. Despite Judge Hand’s own admission that 
actual copying was “extremely improbable” and that “no jury” could ever find 
for the plaintiff, he chose to order a jury trial—almost as if to suggest that 
access to a full adversarial process was a right on its own. “[A]dvocacy in a jury-
room is a black art, but our country exhibits great, and perhaps increasing, 
passion for it, and we must not invade it.”280 
Judge Hand then weighed in on the summary judgment question as well, 
prophetically noting that courts “have constantly to resist the disposition of 
many of the district judges to be rid of the burden of long trials like these.”281 
The observation is interesting and should be contrasted with Judge Frank’s 
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belief that the trial would be “quick.” It suggests that, whereas Judge Frank 
believed that the lower court was a little too sure about the facts involved in 
the case, Judge Hand believed that the lower court was avoiding work in order 
to dispose of more cases. Unlike Judge Frank, though, Judge Hand left open the 
possibility that a judge might “direct a verdict for the defendant” after trial.282  
We learn from later correspondence between Judge Frank and Judge 
Clark that, at the end of the initial conference, Judge Hand had initially decided 
to author the opinion in the case himself.283 Yet, the very next day, he changed 
his mind and asked Judge Frank to write it, at which time Judge Hand “outlined 
his views as to details.”284 Judge Hand’s decision to side with Judge Frank ended 
the confrontation leading up to the opinions, with Judge Frank and Judge 
Clark then producing their respective opinions—in turn emphasizing different 
issues. 
*    *    * 
The early and heated exchange between the judges right after the oral 
argument in Arnstein reveals two important things. First, Judge Frank and 
Judge Hand were motivated in their decision to afford the plaintiff a trial in 
large part by their own musical sensibilities, i.e., their identification of some 
nonnegligible musical similarity between the works, which in each of their 
individual views deserved further examination. While they recognized 
themselves as untrained “lay” listeners, they remained altogether unwilling to 
entrust the explanation of this similarity to a musical expert, preferring 
instead to let the plaintiff have a trial before a lay jury. Second, Judge Frank’s 
decision in the case does not appear to have been motivated—at least initially—
by his dislike of summary judgment. As we see, it was only when Judge Clark 
chose to emphasize the issue and attribute their disagreement to it that Judge 
Frank found a useful procedural outlet to give effect to his initial intuitive 
hunch. Indeed, this explains why, despite the fact that Judge Frank’s other 
opinions around the same time criticized summary judgment, his initial memo 
in Arnstein said almost nothing about the vices of summary judgment. This is 
hardly to suggest that Judge Frank was driven by copyright doctrine in any 
significant way. Copyright law and policy were silent participants in the 
judges’ formulation of their views in the case.  
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B. Rationalizing the Hunch 
During the actual drafting of the opinion, there appears to have been very 
little correspondence between the judges. When the judges did communicate, it 
was largely over their respective interpretations of a few technical procedural 
rules that were at issue in the case.285 The correspondence also reveals that, 
during the drafting, Judge Frank telephoned Judge Clark in an effort to explain 
the true basis of their disagreement, characterizing it as a difference of opinion 
on “degrees of copying and of use of musical expertness.”286 Upon seeing Judge 
Frank’s draft opinion, Judge Clark found this explanation useless, noting in a 
letter to Judge Frank that he could not “see anything in it at all and that it 
merely adds to the confusion into which this whole subject will go with the 
appearance of [Judge Frank’s] opinion.”287 He further observed that an 
“attempted distinction of this kind in the hands of the jury can add only to the 
other confusion.”288 
With this, the judges came to produce their opinions. Several weeks after 
the case was decided and the opinions were filed, Judge Frank and Judge Clark 
continued to squabble about the majority opinion in Arnstein and its 
implications. On one occasion, Judge Clark wrote that the majority opinion 
signaled Judge Frank’s belief that the plaintiff should recover.289 This 
observation prompted Judge Frank to produce two new letters explaining 
what he had intended to achieve in the majority opinion. His observations in 
these documents are quite telling, for in them we see his first (and only) effort 
to explain—albeit post hoc—his actual reasoning. When read together with his 
overall legal philosophy, these documents reveal a great deal about the logic of 
Arnstein. 
As the discussion below details, these memos reveal that—as previously 
insinuated—Judge Frank’s real reason for formulating improper appropriation 
as a question for the jury was to allow his hunch in the case to be tested by a 
collection of lay individuals (rather than a solitary judge). His peculiar 
sequencing of the analysis (i.e., into two steps) was crafted in an effort to enable 
this testing to occur. 
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1.  A jury trial to test a hunch 
In his postdecision letter to Judge Clark on the case, Judge Frank continued 
to insist that the majority’s (i.e., his opinion’s) rationale for sending the case 
back to the lower court was not premised on the belief that Arnstein should in 
fact recover, but instead on the notion that Arnstein deserved a chance to 
adduce additional evidence in support of his claims. In particular, Judge Frank 
believed that even if a trial might result in a verdict for the defendant, deciding 
the case on summary judgment was “prejudging the merits of the case.”290 As 
noted previously, Judge Hand too seems to have adopted a similar position 
when he observed that it was “extremely improbable” that the defendant had 
access to the plaintiff1’s work, let alone that he actually copied from it. 
Judge Frank also believed that Judge Clark’s “jibe” at him (in his dissenting 
opinion) for insisting on a jury trial was totally “unjustified” given Judge 
Frank’s known dislike for juries.291 He insisted that, “as a judge,” he had a duty 
to follow the law and ensure that the jury worked “according to the accepted 
rules” until an amendment rendered the jury system moot.292 In one important 
respect then, Judge Clark appears to have been grossly incorrect: Judge Frank’s 
decision had less to do with his belief that the plaintiff should win and more to 
do with his lack of confidence that the plaintiff should lose. In other words, the 
majority’s insistence on a jury was borne out of an obvious lack of confidence 
that emanated from the majority’s own musical sensibilities, which had 
detected some similarity between the works. Yet being unwilling to base a 
decision for the plaintiff on his and Judge Hand’s sense of similarity between 
the works, Judge Frank chose to have their hunch tested by a lay jury.  
Judge Frank’s emphasis on sending the case to a jury to test this hunch is 
discernible not just in his discussion of improper appropriation, but also in his 
discussion of access. Whereas he was unwilling to find proof of copying 
without any similarity even when there was extensive proof of access, he was 
nonetheless perfectly comfortable inferring copying when there was no proof 
of access but an extensive amount of similarity between the works.293 In other 
words, even in the assessment of actual copying, the similarity between the 
works was to play a far more important role than proof of access. This 
formulation was in a real sense tailor-made for Ira Arnstein. Given Arnstein’s 
inability to offer any evidence of access, proof of actual copying seemed to be 
altogether missing. By allowing the absence of such evidence to be overcome 
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by “similarities”—which needed to be striking, or “marked”—Judge Frank gave 
Arnstein a chance to have his case move forward. 
In the end then, Judge Frank’s willingness (and desire) to allow the jury to 
test his hunch can be explained by his extreme fact skepticism, which in turn 
motivated much of his thinking by the time of Arnstein. Recall that in Judge 
Frank’s view, factfinding in lower courts was the single most difficult and 
troubling part of the judicial system. The subjectivity and imperfections of the 
factfinding process rendered the very idea of legal rights and rules altogether 
unpredictable and flimsy in his account.294 Consequently, the lower court’s 
extreme confidence in the “fantastical” nature of the plaintiff1’s case troubled 
Judge Frank greatly. In his view, the lower court had insufficient evidence to 
make that determination. In particular, he believed that the pro se plaintiff1’s 
lack of familiarity with the specialized rules of evidence and motion practice 
likely meant that the court did not obtain a full picture of the factual record.295 
While Judge Frank certainly did not believe that handing the case over to 
a jury would produce a perfect account of the facts (nor did he likely believe 
that such a thing was ever possible), he was nonetheless willing to trust a jury 
of “lay” listeners over an overburdened and likely prejudiced trial court judge 
in order to test the viability of his hunch. And this, of course, put him in an 
awkward position, given his otherwise well-known dislike of juries. Yet, as 
between a decision on summary judgment—which would have skirted the 
similarity question altogether—and one left to a jury’s intuitions, he was 
willing to countenance the latter, given the facts of the case and his hunch.  
Indeed, while Judge Frank was otherwise skeptical of juries insofar as they 
sought to apply rules, he nevertheless considered them viable arbiters of 
hunches. Speaking of hunches, he once observed that juries reach their 
decisions through “an unanalyzed, undifferentiated, composite reaction—a 
‘hunch’ or unanalytic ‘gestalt’ (a ‘whole’)” and that “[t]here is very considerable 
reason to believe that juries often do not go beyond such composite (or gestalt) 
reactions in arriving at their verdicts.”296 Juries thus hunched their way to 
decisions too. And to the extent that a hunch was a legitimate basis for a 
decision (in the fact skeptic’s account), using a jury (or an “advisory jury”297) to 
this end was altogether unproblematic. As a fact skeptic, Judge Frank’s real 
concerns were when a judge chose to rationalize this hunch by “fudging” the 
subjective nature of the factfinding process in the analytic logic of the law, 
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because in doing this, the judge would avoid appellate scrutiny and mask the 
real reasons for decision.298 This posed an obvious problem: 
A trial judge, seeking to effectuate his gestalt, may make and publish an 
unconsciously “fudged” finding which, in terms of a legal rule as he interprets it, 
justifies his decision in favor of the plaintiff. Suppose that the upper court 
interprets that rule differently. The upper court, accepting the trial judge’s 
finding (because the testimony was oral), applies to the finding that rule so 
interpreted—with the result that the upper court decides for the defendant. Had 
the trial court correctly anticipated the upper court’s interpretation of the rule, he 
might have made a different finding—indeed one that would have necessitated no 
“fudging”—which would have led to an affirmance of his decision for the 
plaintiff.299 
This was precisely what Judge Frank was avoiding in Arnstein. For Judge 
Frank, a hardened fact skeptic, accepting the factual subjectivity of supposedly 
legal questions meant that a subjective but unfudged and fact-based jury verdict 
was preferable to an objective but fudged judicial decision. Even though juries 
do not ever write reasoned opinions for their findings, Judge Frank seems to 
have believed that relegating their role to the subjective components of the 
inquiry acknowledged the subjectivity of the determination, instead of 
masking it in the false rationality of legal doctrine. To be sure, jury verdicts 
were hardly reasoned orders that could be subject to appellate scrutiny. Yet, 
unlike fudged opinions, they were designed to be inscrutable owing to their 
subjectivity, a reality reflected in the “no reasonable jury” standard of scrutiny 
that appellate courts continue to apply when reviewing jury verdicts. The 
actual availability of appellate scrutiny was, to Judge Frank, far less important 
than its farcical nature when so made available as a structural matter.  
When the case was sent back to the lower court following the Second 
Circuit’s admonition in Arnstein that the case be sent to a jury, the district court 
did in fact conduct a jury trial. Amid much fanfare, the jury—as predicted—
disbelieved Arnstein’s story and found for the defendant.300 Of course, Arnstein 
appealed the verdict to the Second Circuit again, and the matter reached a panel 
consisting of Judges Frank, Hand, and Harrie Chase. In a per curiam opinion, 
the court affirmed the verdict.301 Yet the panel chose to emphasize that the 
court’s prior decision—to remand it for a jury trial—had been correct, even 
though the jury thought the case meritless. In a three-sentence unsigned 
opinion, the panel went out of its way to observe that “[t]here can be no doubt 
that the evidence upon the trial presented a disputed issue as to whether the 
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defendant had in fact copied the plaintiff1’s music; and that it was not so clearly 
in the plaintiff1’s favor that the judge could properly have directed a verdict.”302 
Clearly defensive of the decision to order a jury trial, the panel’s authors—
two of whom had constituted the majority in the prior decision—continued to 
believe that the previous decision had been the right choice, result aside. The 
jury trial was therefore in the end little more than an effort to test a hunch. 
2. Two-step copying 
Arnstein’s best-known and most enduring contribution to copyright law—
one that continues to influence courts to this day—is its bifurcation of the 
infringement analysis into two steps: actual copying and improper 
appropriation. All the same, the opinion itself says very little about its reasons 
for the bifurcation and the various embellishments that it introduces into each 
step. In addition, in the opinion, Judge Frank describes the test in declaratory 
and prophetic terms.303 The post-opinion correspondence between Judges 
Frank and Clark, as well as Judge Frank’s own writing on the utility of 
subjective (i.e., unrationalized) judgments, sheds important light on a possible 
rationale for this construction. 
a. Weak precedent 
In their post-opinion correspondence, Judge Clark wrote a detailed 
response to Judge Frank’s first postdecision letter in which Judge Frank had 
attempted to explain the basis of his decision in the case. In his letter, Judge 
Clark ridiculed Judge Frank’s two-step approach as “highly novel and 
devastating,” since it required that a decision on “the really important issue 
must be made without expert help of any kind,” rendering it “a matter of 
chance with the jury.”304 To Judge Clark, “[t]here was nothing in the cases even 
to suggest this,” meaning that it was no more than “a way of getting rid of the 
prior authority in favor of expert evidence.”305 He thus warned Judge Frank 
that it was “going to haunt us in plagiarism cases from now on.”306 
Judge Frank fired off a spirited defense of his position the very next day. 
His defensiveness came out in the early lines of this second letter, where he 
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made the somewhat childish points that Judge Hand was “in every sense, the 
co-author of [the] Arnstein opinion” and that an author of a leading book on 
musical copyright had characterized Judge Hand as having “made the ‘law of 
copyright.’”307 
In the letter, Judge Frank outlined a series of cases—from the same circuit 
as well as from others308—that he believed supported both the bifurcated 
inquiry and the exclusion of expert evidence. All of Judge Frank’s authorities 
on the bifurcated inquiry are, however, less direct than he declares in this 
letter. First, while they do hint at the general idea that copying is not 
automatically copyright infringement,309 none of them attempt to separate out 
the different dimensions of copying into independent analytical steps. Second, 
and perhaps more importantly, some of the authorities that he references had 
made the distinction within the context of “fair use,”310 which had been in 
existence for a while by the time of Arnstein and which Judge Frank 
overlooked altogether.311 Judge Frank’s citation to cases of “abridgement,” 
“compilations,” and “quotations in works of criticism”—three forms of copying 
that offer the copier a defense to an infringement claim—suggest that he 
conflated the standard for infringement with defenses to infringement.312  
Judge Frank’s discussion of expert evidence was equally unpersuasive. In 
the letter, he cited to cases that described the test as that of the “ordinary 
observer,” as “ingenuous,” and as based on a “complex of . . . impressions.”313 Yet 
none of these descriptions seemed to render expert evidence ipso facto 
“irrelevant” as Arnstein did.314 Surely to the extent that melody was the core 
element in the “comparative method” noted earlier, even a lay jury needed 
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some guidance on the difference between melody, rhythm, and other parts of a 
musical work. 
Judge Clark all too easily recognized the weakness of Judge Frank’s 
defense. In what would be the last piece of correspondence between them on 
the case, Judge Clark wrote a short response in which he observed that “[t]he 
cases you cite show how hard you must grub for not even a faint suggestion of 
what you have done” and ended the debate by noting that there “[wa]sn’t much 
use in going on.”315 Judge Frank was certainly scouring for some support for 
his analytical moves, but the cases offered none. All the same, if we take a step 
back and reconsider Judge Frank’s judicial philosophy and writing, his 
analytical moves in Arnstein paint a different picture—one whose palette 
borrows colors from beyond copyright law. 
b. Minimizing fudging through subjective judgments 
Analytics and evidence aside, the core distinction between the two steps of 
the bifurcated inquiry is that, in theory, summary judgment is available on the 
step of actual copying but almost never on illicit copying, since the illicit 
copying analysis is to operate as an impressionistic test for a lay jury. Why 
might this matter? Since the two steps are cumulative, allowing summary 
judgment on the latter could in practice destabilize the first by enabling a judge 
to “fudge” the existence of sufficient similarity/dissimilarity between the 
works in order to avoid a trial. In other words, a judge could simply say that 
despite the presence of access and similarity, the similarity was insubstantial, 
meriting a dismissal of the case. And this was most likely to happen in cases 
where the judge disbelieved a plaintiff1’s theory of access, as in Arnstein. The 
bifurcated inquiry thus ensured that the similarity between the works became 
the dispositive element of the test on both prongs. Whenever there was some 
similarity between the works, the jury—and not the judge—had to decide 
whether the similarity proved copying (with or without access) and was 
sufficiently illicit so as to be actionable. The only circumstance under which a 
summary disposal of the case was permitted under this formulation was 
therefore when there was absolutely no similarity between the works at all. 
Unlike latent similarities or dissimilarities, which could operate as perfect 
fodder for the lower court to give play to its various biases—be they 
sociological, reputational, or individual to the case—such “patent” dissimilarity 
would be hard for a trial judge to mask.316 Writing a few years after Arnstein, 
Judge Frank thus noted: 
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When a trial judge does publish “findings”, they are but a report of his belief about 
the facts. He may (intentionally or unintentionally) misreport what he believes, in 
order to circumvent the precedents—in the interest of what he deems just, or very 
occasionally out of other less praiseworthy motives (induced by bribery or “pull”). 
No one except the trial judge knows whether, in his published “findings”, he 
accurately reports or “fudges” (i.e., distorts) his belief, for no one else can disprove 
the accuracy of such a report of an inner “state of mind”. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . [I]n the mine-run of law suits—that is, the great bulk of law suits—the 
prejudices of judges and jurors for or against particular individual witnesses, have 
no “large-scale social” character, and lack uniformity. They are distinctively 
individual, unconscious, un-get-at-able.317 
Recall that the Arnstein opinion reiterated Judge Frank’s famed concern 
with unconscious biases in decisionmaking.318 Judge Frank thus held a rather 
pessimistic view of trial court judging, borne of his extreme fact skepticism. 
The bifurcated test in Arnstein was meant to guard against the possibility of a 
judge’s “fudging” the intrinsically subjective inquiry of improper appropriation 
in order to avoid a trial on copying. It appears that Judge Clark scarcely 
understood (let alone approved of1) this rationale for the test.  
Judge Frank’s disallowance of expert testimony for illicit copying had 
similar roots. Judge Frank strongly believed that certain categories of decisions 
were more intuitive than analytical in that they defied being broken down into 
component parts. Indeed, insisting that such decisions be made in parts was 
likely to confuse the analysis merely for the sake of nominal analytical 
coherence.319 This was an offshoot of his theory about hunches. Rather 
interestingly, though, Judge Frank’s prime example of a hunch that was 
intrinsically incapable of disaggregation was music: 
The gestaltist’s favorite illustration is a melody: a melody does not result from the 
summation of its parts; thus to analyze a melody is to destroy it. It is a basic, primary 
unit. The melody, a pattern, determines the function of the notes, its parts; the 
notes, the parts, do not determine the melody. Just so, say the gestaltists, no 
analysis of a pattern of thought, of a response to a situation, can account for the 
pattern.320 
Relying extensively on work in the field of linguistics, Judge Frank came 
to believe that some judicial decisional processes, “like the artistic process, 
involve[d] feelings that words cannot ensnare” because they contained 
“overtones inexpressible in words.”321 While he made this observation 
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primarily in relation to judicial factfinding,322 the logic carries over to jury-
based decisions as well. The comparison of two works was meant to be a 
“subjective” determination, which he embraced.323 Yet an expert’s interposition 
of an objective structure on that subjective determination risked skewing the 
determination. 
Indeed, we see this preference for subjectivity in the early correspondence 
between the judges in Arnstein. Judge Clark had used his conversations with 
musical expert Luther Noss to contradict Judge Frank’s musical hunch and 
detection of some patent similarity between the works in the case. As Judge 
Clark (channeling Noss) put it, the similarity was “the repetitious high E . . . 
meaningless in terms of music.”324 Judge Frank’s simple strategy for 
overcoming this musicological objection to the similarity was to render all 
expert testimony on the question presumptively irrelevant as a legal matter. 
While it was hardly the only strategy available to him, it was certainly the 
easiest. And this he successfully achieved through a prohibition on expert 
testimony that he rooted in a theory about intuitive lay decisionmaking.325 
The exclusion of expert testimony on illicit copying was as much about 
precluding any reliance on Noss’s views as it was about giving effect to Judge 
Frank’s (and Judge Hand’s) “inexpressible” detection of musical similarity 
between the works. In Judge Frank’s view, such similarity had to be intuitively 
assessed, and not through the use of analysis, reasoning, or expertise, because 
an evaluation of the similarity, much like other subjective, intuitive inquiries, 
was inexpressible in words. This process rendered the comparison in 
infringement cases palpably “unintelligent,” in turn raising the specter of a host 
of subjective decisional biases.326 This is the legacy that copyright law has had 
to live with for decades. 
*    *    * 
Judge Frank’s ex post rationalization of Arnstein, as well as his writing on 
connected issues, reveals that the opinion’s most important legal moves were 
driven in large measure by his subjective reaction to the facts of the particular 
case and by his desire to ensure that the plaintiff obtained a jury trial so that 
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Judge Frank’s own initial reaction would be tested. Judge Frank’s views on 
summary judgment and substantive copyright law and policy became mere 
vehicles on the path to this goal. The irony is, of course, that Judge Frank 
claimed to be driven by a desire to avoid creating a “bad precedent” in Arnstein, 
when by most accounts his actual opinion in the case unequivocally did just 
that. 
C. Five Days Later . . . 
Perhaps the best evidence we have that Arnstein was a product of Judge 
Frank’s skeptical reaction to the unique facts of the case, rather than a 
concerted decision to direct the structure of the infringement analysis in the 
abstract, comes from a copyright infringement case that the same panel decided 
a mere five days after Arnstein1: Heim v. Universal Pictures Co.327 Much like 
Arnstein, Heim also involved the standard for copyright infringement, and yet 
hardly any copyright scholarship references or cites to it. 
In Heim, the plaintiff was a Hungarian composer who claimed that his 
musical composition had been plagiarized by the defendants through their use 
of a substantially similar musical work in a movie that they produced.328 The 
plaintiff based his claim of access on the fact that his music was popularized in a 
Hungarian movie that played in the United States on several occasions. The 
plaintiff had also attempted to have his music used by the defendant studio and 
sent the studio his compositions for this purpose.329 The lower court conducted 
a bench trial on the case, during which the plaintiff1’s expert testified that he 
was able to detect a “substantial similarity” between the works and that the 
plaintiff1’s work did not show any similarity to Antonin Dvorak’s 
“Humoresque.”330 The defendant in turn introduced its own expert who 
claimed that, while there was similarity to the “average ear,” both works drew 
on Dvorak’s “Humoresque,” a prominent work in the field.331 The similarity, 
according to the defendant’s expert, resulted from this common source.  
Based on all of this evidence, the district court found for the defendant—
reasoning that while the similarity was obvious and clear, the evidence of 
access was “contradictory and untrustworthy.”332 On appeal, the court—in an 
opinion again authored by Judge Frank and joined by Judge Hand—affirmed.  
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While Judge Frank found the two works to be similar and concluded that the 
plaintiff1’s work was “distinguishable from Dvorak’s,” he nonetheless found 
that the district court’s ruling, that the plaintiff1’s work “did not possess enough 
originality, raising it above the level of the banal, to preclude coincidence as an 
adequate explanation of the identity,” was not error.333 He was quick to add 
that this did “not mean that such originality is essential to the validity of a 
copyright.”334 In essence, then, Judge Frank was using the banality of the 
plaintiff1’s work to infer the absence of copying as a matter of circumstantial 
evidence—even though the work itself was sufficiently original. The 
contradiction is obvious. If the work is sufficiently original to merit 
protection, then even if proof of access was low, the “identity” (in Judge Frank’s 
own words) should have allowed an inference of copying with the question of 
illicit appropriation then going to a jury.  
In addition, the opinion seemed completely unconcerned with the fact that 
a judge had conducted the trial and made findings of fact on the record. In their 
communications, Judge Clark pointed this out to Judge Frank335—whose only 
explanation (which he attributed to Judge Hand) was that “in Heim we have a 
lower court decision with findings af.[t1]er a trial1” and that the appellate court 
did not reach “the question of illicit appropriation.”336 The trial in Heim did not 
go to a jury, much as it did not in Arnstein. The principal difference was, of 
course, that in Arnstein, the factfinding had been undertaken as part of a 
summary judgment motion rather than as part of a formal trial. Yet, in Heim 
too—much like in Arnstein—the judge had relied on depositions (rather than 
open testimony) from several key witnesses, including the plaintiff. The judge’s 
factfinding in Heim was thus no more or less tainted than that in Arnstein, 
especially since both lower courts had limited themselves to the issue of actual 
copying and had never reached improper appropriation. To Judge Clark, the 
contradiction in treating like cases differently was obvious, and he chose to 
write an opinion concurring only in the result. He nonetheless disagreed with 
the majority on the question of infringement and stated: 
That results at once so divergent and so musically astonishing as the decisions in 
these two cases can occur simultaneously I can attribute only to the novel 
conceptions of legal plagiarism first announced in the Arnstein case and now 
repeated here. By these the issue is no longer one of musical similarity or identity 
to justify the conclusion of copying—an issue to be decided with all the 
intelligence, musical as well as legal, we can bring to bear upon it—but is one, 
first, of copying, to be decided more or less intelligently, and, second, of illicit 
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copying, to be decided blindly on a mere cacophony of sounds. Just at which stage 
decision here has occurred, I am not sure.337 
Judge Clark was in effect accusing Judge Frank of fudging the analysis of 
copying to give effect to his views on “illicit copying.” Judge Frank had no 
response, despite being the architect of the Arnstein test. 
Judge Frank’s poorly reasoned majority opinion in Heim and the obvious 
contradiction in its logic underscore an important point: Arnstein was entirely 
about the facts of the particular case and Judge Frank’s burning desire to afford 
the plaintiff a nominal victory on appeal so as to enable a jury trial on his 
claim. Heim reveals how completely unwedded in principle Judge Frank was to 
(i) jury trials, (ii) summary/expedited disposals in copyright cases, and sadly 
enough, (iii) the fundamental analytical basis of copyright law. 
IV. Exorcising the Ghost of Arnstein 
Having examined how the infamous Arnstein test came to be and the 
myriad philosophical and contextual influences that caused its author to 
structure it in the way that he did, this Part moves to the prescriptive. It begins 
by arguing that the Arnstein opinion (or test) originates in a philosophical 
worldview that distrusts trial court decisionmaking (Part IV.A) and then 
describes how this attitude has since come to be openly rejected (Part IV.B). It 
then describes the downsides of Arnstein’s trial court skepticism for copyright 
law (Part IV.C) and provides the outline of an alternative approach, one that 
eschews this skeptical outlook in favor of a nonskeptical one while retaining 
some of the useful analytical lessons of Arnstein, which Judge Frank drew from 
Judge Hand’s prior jurisprudence (Part IV.D).  
An important caveat is in order here. While Part IV.D offers an alternative 
approach to the infringement analysis, its objective is hardly to suggest that 
this alternative is in any sense ideal for copyright law. It merely intends to 
show what a nonskeptical approach to the copyright infringement analysis 
might look like if it were to rid itself of Arnstein’s skeptical influence. 
A. The Ghost of Arnstein1: Trial Court Skepticism 
As we saw in the previous Part, the majority opinion in Arnstein—which 
continues to influence copyright jurisprudence to this day—was almost 
entirely a product of its author’s unique perspective on legal and judicial 
decisionmaking.338 This outlook is best described as a philosophy of 
skepticism: a belief that legal rules are intrinsically manipulable in the hands of 
judges, that factfinding in lower courts is structurally problematic, and that 
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lower court decisions routinely attempt to “fudge” their reasoning to conform 
to rules and precedents. 
Judge Frank therefore structured his opinion in Arnstein—and with it the 
test for copyright infringement—to give effect to his intense fact skepticism. 
The unquestionable hallmark of the test remains its deep distrust of trial court 
decisionmaking and factfinding. As we saw, the bifurcation of the inquiry into 
“actual” (step 1) and “illicit” (step 2) copying, the allowance of expert testimony 
in one but not the other, and the impermissibility of summary judgment on the 
latter and often on the former were moves driven by Judge Frank’s efforts to 
allow the musical similarity that he perceived in the case to be tested before a 
lay jury.339 He had little faith that a trial court judge would have given 
Arnstein a fair hearing, and cabining the trial court’s powers in significant 
fashion was therefore a necessary means to the end that he sought. In Arnstein, 
we find resonances of his overall philosophy towards trial court 
decisionmaking, which he elaborated on elsewhere: 
You cannot control [trial] courts unless you can also control their fact-finding. 
But that you usually can’t do. For the process of fact-finding is altogether too 
subjective and, consequently, too elusive. It is “un-ruly.” The refusal to recognize 
such unruliness constitutes modern legal magic. It stems from a “desire to be 
deceived.”340 
Judge Frank’s skepticism therefore manifested itself in a desire to “control” the 
vicissitudes of trial court decisionmaking, for he recognized that no amount of 
procedural reform could eliminate the subjectivity about which he was 
complaining.341 No amount of practical reform was, to him, sufficient to 
remedy this. 
The Arnstein test was therefore very much a product of Judge Frank’s 
extreme skepticism about trial courts and their ability to adjudicate factual 
disputes through legal rules and guidelines. The structure of its inquiry as well 
as the several embellishments superimposed on that structure were in large 
part a concerted effort to minimize trial court “fudg[ing]”342 and to ensure that 
factfinding in plagiarism (i.e., nonliteral copyright infringement) cases did not 
hide behind abstract doctrinal rules that were open to latent manipulation. 
While Judge Frank never made this explicit in the opinion (for obvious 
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reasons), the backstory to its development as well as his extensive writings 
confirm this reality.  
Given the Arnstein test’s origins in Judge Frank’s idiosyncratic philosophy, 
it is somewhat surprising and perhaps disturbing that its lessons—structural as 
well as substantive—continue to influence copyright jurisprudence. While 
scholars have critiqued elements of the test over the years343 and proposed 
reforming it to introduce some measure of rationality into its functioning, 
unless its fundamental premise of skepticism is jettisoned in its entirety, its 
influence is unlikely to diminish. The logical structure of Judge Frank’s 
reasoning and its interconnected parts have ensured that unless its edifice is 
reevaluated as a whole, its skeptical ideals will inform every aspect of the 
infringement inquiry. As an illustration of this, consider a recent opinion of 
the Fourth Circuit, reversing a trial court’s finding of noninfringement on a 
motion to dismiss. 
In Copeland v. Bieber, the plaintiff claimed that the well-known musicians 
Justin Bieber and Usher had copied his song in their song of the same name, 
“Somebody to Love.”344 Much like other circuits, the Fourth Circuit has 
adopted a two-step test based on Arnstein. In the first step, known as the 
“extrinsic” test, the court is to undertake an objective comparison of the two 
works to assess their similarity, using expert testimony and analytic 
dissection.345 The second step, the “intrinsic” test, is then treated as a question 
exclusively for the jury, to be decided without any expert input or 
dissection.346 In Copeland, the district court granted the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss, concluding that the copying did not meet the intrinsic similarity test 
since the “general public” was unlikely to see the works as substantially similar, 
despite the existence of some similarities.347 Recognizing that the test was 
ordinarily one for a jury, the court concluded that no reasonable jury could 
find such similarity, which merited a dismissal.348  
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit disagreed.349 Reaffirming the no reasonable 
jury standard for the analysis when there was no jury trial, Judge Harris 
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proceeded to compare the two songs “side by side” and “in their entirety.”350 
Abjuring any expert testimony, dissection, or analysis, and based entirely on 
her own auditory sensibility in comparing the two songs, she concluded that 
the “choruses are similar enough and also significant enough that a reasonable 
jury could find the songs intrinsically similar.”351 In both decisions, the judges 
were attempting to predict the reaction of the “lay audience” to the music, 
without the aid of any expert evidence—under the garb of the no reasonable 
jury standard. The appellate court’s only reason to reverse was because the 
district court judge had made the decision on his own without sending it to a 
jury. In other words, had the decision in the lower court come from a jury 
verdict, Judge Harris would have found little reason to reverse, especially given 
the subjective nature of the “intrinsic test.” What triggered the skepticism was 
simply that the district court judge had substituted his opinion for the jury’s.  
But why should an appellate court prefer a jury’s finding of similarity (or 
nonsimilarity) to a trial court judge’s when neither is aided by expert 
testimony? The no reasonable jury standard that Judge Harris relied on is but a 
mechanism that requires heightened deference to a jury on the question at issue 
and thus does little normative work of its own without an underlying reason 
for treating the question as one for the jury to begin with.  
The answer to the question posed above is at once both obvious and 
strikingly gloomy. The preference for a jury determination derives from an 
unwillingness to trust a trial court’s (i.e., judge’s) factfinding ability, a mistrust 
that is structurally entrenched in the two-step test’s division of labor between 
the judge and jury. The Fourth Circuit’s decision is but a relic of the skeptical 
approach propounded in Arnstein, where the lower court is forbidden from 
allowing the introduction of expert testimony and/or relying on its own 
assessment of the second step of the infringement analysis. The desire to 
control the lower court’s own factfinding remains at the heart of the 
framework, however it is articulated. Handing the core question of similarity 
to a jury is therefore not the result of any belief in the jury’s superior 
competence on the subjective assessment but a product of the belief—engrained 
in the Arnstein framework—that a judge should neither make that assessment 
nor indeed control it by allowing the jury to hear expert evidence. Arnstein’s 
ghost thus continues to haunt the copyright infringement analysis.  
B. The Abandonment of Trial Court Skepticism 
The deep irony here is of course that this philosophy of trial court 
skepticism has since come to be openly repudiated by the federal judiciary. 
Recall that the principal manifestation of Judge Frank’s skepticism was marked 
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reluctance to task trial judges (rather than juries) with factfinding, which in 
turn manifested itself in an unwillingness to decide cases on summary 
judgment. Yet the Supreme Court has encouraged trial judges to engage with 
facts in the years since Arnstein, most palpably in its standards for summary 
judgment and motions to dismiss. Judicial factfinding in the federal system is a 
reality not begrudgingly accepted but actively praised.352 
The first overt move signaling the system’s acceptance of judicial 
factfinding came in the Supreme Court’s endorsement of district courts’ use of 
summary judgment. In its well-known “trilogy” of cases on the appropriate 
standard for summary judgment, the Court in 1986 not only relaxed the 
standard for a trial court’s use of summary judgment to dispose of cases but also 
exhorted courts to use the mechanism.353 Indeed, scholars have pointed out 
that the basic philosophy underlying the trilogy was “skepticism, if not a 
downright distrust, of juries,” which implied district judges taking more 
control over proceedings in order to avoid wasteful trials when the factual 
allegations were flimsy.354 A greater reliance on summary judgment obviously 
requires judges to base their decisions on an early evaluation of the factual 
allegations (at the close of discovery) to determine whether there are “genuine” 
issues of material facts that remain. In other words, it contemplates a more 
significant role for judges in evaluating the parties’ factual claims. As one 
scholar puts it, in deciding a case on summary judgment, the judge “decides 
whether factual inferences from the evidence are reasonable, applies the law to 
any ‘reasonable’ factual inferences, and as a result makes the determination as 
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477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 
586 (1986). 
 354. STEPHEN N. SUBRIN & MARGARET Y.K. WOO, LITIGATING IN AMERICA: CIVIL PROCEDURE 
IN CONTEXT 170 (2006); see also Linda S. Mullenix, The 25th Anniversary of the Summary 
Judgment Trilogy1: Much Ado About Very Little, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 561, 561 (2012) 
(observing how the cases are understood as “telegraphing a message to federal judges to 
make enhanced usage of summary judgment to expedite legal proceedings and to 
intercept and dismiss factually deficient litigation before trial”). 
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to whether a claim could exist.”355 Indeed, the Supreme Court’s own standard 
for summary judgment insists that the court examine whether the evidence 
(i.e., facts) was “sufficient” to support the claim under consideration.356  
Even though it remains unclear whether the trilogy itself produced a 
discernible change in trial court behavior, the evidence does point to the fact 
that, since at least the 1960s, district courts around the country have become 
more willing to dispose of cases using summary judgment.357 While this may 
have been the product of other changes in substantive law, the composition of 
courts’ dockets, or case management techniques, it remains unquestionably 
true that summary judgment and, with it, district court judges’ appraisal of the 
factual strengths of the claim have both become a mainstay of federal court 
practice.  
This trend towards endorsing judicial factfinding at the trial court level 
has continued most recently in the Court’s modified standard for motions to 
dismiss. In its twin decisions on the standard, the Court concluded that, in 
deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, a district court had to do no 
more than ascertain if there were “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.”358 Plausibility, rather than “conceivab[ility]” was thus to 
be the driving standard, which in turn requires determining whether the 
“factual matter” was “sufficient” to state a claim.359 The standard itself thus 
leaves little doubt that it requires judges to make a determination on the facts 
of the case, even before deciding whether to proceed to discovery and/or to 
send it to a jury for a trial. 
Consequently, it is no exaggeration to suggest that Judge Frank’s 
intrinsically skeptical attitude towards judicial factfinding and the role of 
judges in engaging the facts of a dispute are for the most part—and certainly as 
a doctrinal matter—a relic of the past. The distrust of lower court “fudging” 
finds little resonance or validation in today’s legal standards for federal motion 
practice, all of which seem to envisage a greater role for the judicial 
management of facts. Given that the Arnstein test was driven entirely by this 
skeptical attitude, copyright law’s continuing adherence to it even after the 
wholesale abandonment of its attitudinal assumptions remains somewhat 
embarrassing. 
	
 355. Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 143 
(2007). 
 356. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 
253, 289 (1968)). 
 357. See Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases1: 
Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 592 (2004). 
 358. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 678 (2009). 
 359. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 561, 570. 
Questionable Origins of Copyright Infringement Analysis 
68 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2016) 
855 
 
C. The Downside of Skepticism: An Example 
Despite the fact that the rest of the legal system has since repudiated Judge 
Frank’s extreme trial court skepticism, it remains firmly entrenched in the 
structure and design of the infringement analysis. As discussed previously, 
much of that “analysis” is treated as a question for the jury, which is then asked 
to assess whether the similarity between the works is sufficient so as to be 
characterized as “improper,” in order to be rendered legally actionable.360 In 
making this assessment, the jury is not only denied access to any expert 
testimony but also given surprisingly little guidance on what it should be 
looking for.361  
In an extended effort to take the question away from the trial court judge, 
the infringement analysis classifies the question of improper appropriation—a 
palpably normative determination—as a pure question of fact and operates 
under the legal fiction that the jury’s normative determination is epistemically 
verifiable, just like any other fact about the world. In short, through its use of 
juries, the Arnstein-driven infringement inquiry oversimplifies the complexity 
and normativity of the analysis. Leaving aside the multitude of problems that 
others have identified with the use of juries in civil trials,362 and with the 
Arnstein framework more generally,363 it is this presumptive factual rationality 
that is in many ways the enduring downside of trial court skepticism in the 
infringement analysis.  
The jury’s decision on when a defendant’s copying is improper is treated as 
a finding of fact, one that is inscrutable not because juries are infallible as such 
but instead because that finding is incapable of falsification. In essence, the 
infringement analysis therefore equates a jury’s belief and opinion, under the 
single category of a finding of fact. Whereas a belief involves the acceptance of 
something as “true” and is premised on an assumed objective reality, an opinion 
is intrinsically subjective and by nature beyond verification.364 Yet, the law’s 
	
 360. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69, 472-73 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 361. See id. at 468. Judge Clark was most explicit about the unguided nature of the majority’s 
formulation in Arnstein when he observed that it required having the jury approach the 
question with “complete ignorance.” Id. at 476 n.1 (Clark, J., dissenting).  
 362. See, e.g., FRANKLIN STRIER, RECONSTRUCTING JUSTICE: AN AGENDA FOR TRIAL REFORM 
111 (1994) (describing some of the problems in using civil juries); Clark & Shulman, 
supra note 217, at 867 (detailing the criticism of jury trials); Neil Vidmar, The 
Performance of the American Civil Jury1: An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 849, 850-
51 (1998) (providing an empirical assessment of jury trials). 
 363. See Lemley, supra note 3, at 737-38; Samuelson, supra note 9, at 1827-28, 1828 n.39; see 
also supra note 119. 
 364. Compare Herman Oliphant, Facts, Opinions, and Value-Judgments, 10 TEX. L. REV. 127, 132 
(1932) (detailing the common understanding of opinions as capable of “yield[ing] only 
subjective” results), with Eric Schwitzgebel, Belief, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Mar. 24, 
footnote continued on next page 
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reasons for deferring to a jury’s belief are vastly different from any plausible 
reason for trusting its opinion. With beliefs, these reasons derive from the idea 
that collective decisionmaking and deliberation are likely to iron out any 
individual biases and idiosyncratic biases that an individual decisionmaker (e.g., 
a judge) might have, rendering it more objective.365 With opinions, however, 
collective decisionmaking remains no less subjective than with individual 
decisionmaking. For instance, a group of ten individuals who are asked to 
make an aesthetic judgment about a work of art are unlikely to produce a 
judgment that someone who was not a part of that group will intuitively 
endorse as objectively correct. And if that is true, the mere fact of it being made 
by ten makes it no less subjective than if made by one individual, other than to 
render it collective. Collective/group decisionmaking is therefore hardly 
synonymous on its own with objectivity. It is the conflation of the two that the 
skeptical infringement analysis hides. 
The controversy surrounding the jury verdict in the recent case involving 
the song “Blurred Lines”366 is illustrative. The case involved the question 
whether a song composed by the musicians Pharrell Williams, Robin Thicke, 
and Clifford Harris, Jr., entitled “Blurred Lines,” infringed the musical 
composition in Marvin Gaye’s song “Got to Give It Up.” A jury was empaneled 
in the case and, after a weeklong trial, concluded that there was indeed an 
infringement and awarded the defendant’s (Gaye’s) family damages in the 
amount of $7.4 million.367  
The complexity of the case was such that the allegedly infringed work 
contained innumerable elements that were on their own not protectable 
subject matter (under copyright law), and yet the judge’s instructions to the 
jury were couched in abjectly vague language. Simplifying the two-step test for 
the jury, the instructions thus asked the jury to determine “if an ordinary, 
reasonable listener would conclude that the total concept and feel” of the 
works were substantially similar.368 In addition, the jury was told that they 
were to determine if the portions of similarities were either “qualitatively or 
quantitatively important” to the protected work at issue.369 As should be 
	
2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief (defining belief as “the attitude we have, 
roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true”).  
 365. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1067 (1964) (“The 
distinctive strength and safeguard of the jury system is that the jury operates as a 
group.”). 
 366. Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2014 WL 
7877773 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2014). 
 367. July 14, 2015 Civil Minutes—General at 2, Williams, 2014 WL 7877773 (No. LA CV13-
06004 JAK (AGRx)). 
 368. Jury Instructions at 46, Williams, 2014 WL 7877773 (No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx)). 
 369. Id. 
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apparent, these instructions provide very little guidance to the jury; instead, 
they suggest to the jury—and perhaps rightly so—that copyright law has no 
objective basis for reaching this decision and that the jury is therefore to 
formulate its own opinion, relying on the necessarily vague language in these 
instructions. As scholars have pointed out, with these instructions, there was 
little doubt that the jury chose to embark on a sojourn of its own to eventually 
find for the defendants.370 When later challenged before the judge in the case, 
the jury’s verdict was upheld as “reasonable” and defensible under available 
evidence, and the palpably ambiguous instructions were characterized as 
neither “erroneous [n]or misleading.”371  
The problem with the outcome in this case is hardly that the jury made an 
obvious mistake. The case produced room for reasonable disagreement about 
the legal actionability of the copying. The real problem is instead that the legal 
system will never be able to derive a workable standard from the jury’s finding 
of improper appropriation. While the jury’s finding that the plaintiffs had 
copied from the defendant’s work in the case was premised on objectively 
verifiable evidence (such as the plaintiffs’ testimony and admission), its 
conclusion that this copying was improper was an entirely subjective opinion, 
for which just about any factual basis lends some support. Without a reasoned 
decision, the jury’s opinion on the matter remains a mystery. 
And herein lies the real downside of Arnstein’s skeptical framework. By 
disallowing any judicial involvement in the infringement analysis and 
requiring judicial deference to just about any decision reached by a jury, the 
Arnstein framework effectively freezes the development of a rational 
jurisprudence of copyright infringement. Despite the near-universal 
agreement that the infringement analysis is more than just a factual inquiry372 
and that it involves important normative considerations about the purposes of 
copyright law and its underlying conceptions of right and wrong, the 
treatment of the analysis as a simple factual one deprives copyright law of an 
important analytical lever that courts can use to balance the competing values 
at stake in the system.  
Recall that trial court skepticism grew out of a concern that district court 
judges would manipulate legal doctrine to mask the subjectivity of their 
factfinding. Arnstein’s infringement analysis was thus constructed in an effort 
to avoid having the analysis treated as a question of law in any way or form. 
Yet the deep irony today is that in treating the analysis as a pure question of 
	
 370. See Gordon, supra note 5 (describing the instructions as “[i]nconsistent and misleading”). 
 371. July 14, 2015 Civil Minutes—General, supra note 367, at 22, 26, 28. 
 372. See, e.g., Balganesh, supra note 3, at 227-28; Wendy J. Gordon, The Concept of “Harm” in 
Copyright, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 452, 453 (Shyamkrishna 
Balganesh ed., 2013).  
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fact—for the jury—copyright has deprived itself of a real legal standard for 
treating certain kinds of copying as improper, beyond the reality in any given 
case that twelve randomly chosen individuals deem it to be so.  
D. Reconstructing the Infringement Analysis 
Over the years, scholars have suggested multiple alternatives to the 
Arnstein formulation—none of which have found affirmation by courts. This 
Subpart therefore does not attempt to simplistically add to these proposals. 
Having seen the pernicious effects of trial court fact skepticism on the Arnstein 
test, this Subpart instead attempts to reformulate the infringement analysis by 
seeking to eliminate its core commitment to trial court skepticism. Rather than 
reworking the entirety of the analysis, the alternative framework here retains 
certain elements of the original formulation, recognizing that they represent 
sound copyright logic and need not be jettisoned altogether.373 Principal among 
these is the recognition that (i) not all copying amounts to copyright 
infringement, (ii) copyright infringement is predicated upon proof of copying, 
and (iii) juries should have an important role to play in the purely factual 
aspects of the infringement analysis. With these precepts in mind, this Subpart 
offers an outline of what a nonskeptical, rationally constructed infringement 
analysis might look like, once Arnstein’s skeptical influence on the inquiry has 
been cleansed.374  
	
 373. Each of these precepts holds independent analytical value to the working of the 
copyright system. The allowance for some kinds of copying recognizes the reality that 
use and copying of protected expression can under certain circumstances generate 
social welfare of its own, given that large amounts of creativity are downstream and 
derivative. Copyright’s emphasis on copying is essential to maintain its structure as a 
nonmonopoly right, one where its exclusivity is maintained through the threat of 
litigation rather than through property signals. And lastly, the role of the jury is a 
requirement of the Seventh Amendment, regardless of what one thinks of jury trials 
generally. Additionally, these precepts have each been indirectly affirmed by the 
Supreme Court over the years. 
 374. In recent work, Lemley offers his own proposed reform of the two-step test for 
copyright infringement and suggests the development of “a rule that gives to the jury 
the basic question of whether the defendant copied, which might or might not involve 
expert testimony, but reserves the question of whether the copying was unlawful for 
the court.” Lemley, supra note 3, at 741. The proposal offered here is similar in many 
respects to Lemley’s suggestion that the normative determination be left to the court 
and the factual one left to the juries—and that expert evidence be allowed for both. 
However, it differs in one crucial respect. Lemley appears to remain comfortable 
working with the ordering of the steps along the lines suggested by Arnstein, which in 
itself is a product of Judge Frank’s skepticism and structurally disfavors decision by 
summary judgment. The proposal here, by contrast, jettisons almost all of Arnstein’s 
extreme skepticism. 
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1.  Cognizable similarity 
Arnstein’s bifurcated inquiry was directed at ensuring that judges feel 
compelled to send cases to juries in infringement disputes on a fairly regular 
basis. A revised version that trusts trial court judges would in effect do just the 
opposite. All the same, bifurcation helps separate out pure questions of fact 
from those of law or those of both fact and law. Accordingly, a reformulated 
test would adopt the bifurcated inquiry but instead begin with a question that 
judges should decide as a matter of law, on summary judgment: “cognizable 
similarity.” This would require a judge to assess, at the close of discovery, 
whether there is sufficient similarity between the two works at issue to render 
the claim cognizable for copyright infringement purposes. The question is a 
modified version of the “improper appropriation” step of Arnstein (step 2), 
except that it is now a question of law and abjures any reliance on a “lay” 
listener or audience standard. 
Cognizable similarity would operate as a mixed question of law and fact. It 
would begin with courts having to set out the particular conditions and criteria 
that go into the idea of copying being “improper” or “illicit,” terms that the 
current framework takes for granted. Judges would be expected to decide the 
issue by reference to copyright’s underlying goals and purposes, by asking 
whether the type/form of copying is likely to affect the market for the work, 
or indeed whether it involved freeriding on the creator’s authorial 
contribution to the work, rendering it questionable as a moral matter. Having 
grappled with this question, the judge would then apply the criteria to the 
specific work. It would thereby require the judge to engage in a reasoned 
analysis of the works to decide whether they are similar enough, under the 
normative standards seen to be appropriate for actionability. And surely 
enough, this would require (and allow for) the introduction of expert 
testimony and for the judge to engage in an analytical dissection of the works 
in comparing them, similar to Judge Hand’s famous “comparative method.” 
Such testimony and dissection would guide the judge’s development of the 
appropriate normative criteria for cognizability by ensuring that it comports 
with accepted practices and norms within an area of creativity. Such a reasoned 
approach would also serve the all-important purpose of allowing an actual 
jurisprudence to develop in this area of copyright in common law fashion—
something that copyright law has badly lacked for decades now, owing to the 
anti-intellectual (i.e., intuitive) nature of the question and owing to its 
overreliance on the jury. By taking the question away from juries and 
requiring judges to articulate their findings on this issue, copyright law is 
likely to develop a body of usable precedent that grapples with the question of 
when an instance of copying, even if shown to exist, should be deemed 
cognizable. 
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In addition to producing a measure of consistency and uniformity, such 
jurisprudence would have two other immediate benefits. First, it would create 
patterns of analysis for different categories of works that are protected under 
copyright law, allowing them to each be analyzed and broken down according 
to the prevailing norms of artistic production and cultural consumption that 
exist at any given point in time. Second, it would add content to the nature of 
judges’ intuitions as to when similarity between works rises to the level of 
being wrongful, i.e., cognizable, under copyright law. This latter question is 
crucial because it would force judges to confront their reliance on contextual 
factors, while eliminating the myriad cognitive biases that today hide within 
the black box of the similarity analysis.375 It would also allow judges to 
articulate copyright’s various—and often conflicting—goals and objectives and 
to build these goals into the analysis of legal cognizability, something that the 
current framework altogether disregards. 
Having a judge decide the issue of cognizable similarity at the very outset 
would also align the infringement analysis with courts’ use of summary 
judgment and allow judges to play more of a gatekeeper role in copyright 
lawsuits, thereby avoiding needless trials merely because some similarity 
between the works is detected. In this regard, it would build on all of the 
efficiencies represented in modern-day motion practice. 
2.  Appropriation of protected expression 
Once a judge finds the similarity between two works to be cognizable as a 
matter of law, “only then” does the matter go to a jury, which decides whether 
the similarity was the result of the defendant appropriating (i.e., copying) 
protected expression from the work or the result of independent creation. As a 
purely factual question, appropriation remains a perfect question for the jury 
and thereby allows the analysis to comply with the constitutional mandate of a 
jury trial in copyright infringement lawsuits.376 
However, since the question is whether the defendant copied “protected 
expression” and not just unprotectable material from the protected work, the 
jury would be allowed to hear any evidence that bears on the question. This 
might include evidence on the protectability of elements such as expert 
testimony on stock expression (i.e., scenes-a-faire) and originality in any 
area/genre, an expert’s assessment of the similarity between the works and its 
	
 375. See Balganesh et al., supra note 326, at 284-88. 
 376. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974) (“The Seventh 
Amendment does apply to actions enforcing statutory rights, and requires a jury trial 
upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action 
for damages in the ordinary courts of law.”). 
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probative significance, and the judge’s own dissection of the work from the 
prior step. 
The effect of moving the factual question exclusively to the second step 
would, as a structural matter, allow judges to filter out what they are required 
to send to a jury. In addition, it would prevent a court’s conclusion on the 
question of copying/appropriation from improperly influencing the similarity 
analysis, as it currently does. While giving this question over to the jury would 
of course mean that a reasoned jurisprudence is partially stifled, this is likely to 
matter very little, given that the issue is ultimately one of circumstantial 
evidence, which will indelibly vary from one case to another.  
*    *    * 
This alternative framework is certainly open to manipulation of the kind 
that Judge Frank seems to have feared. In the hands of Judge Frank, indeed it 
might have hardly precluded a jury trial, given that he would likely have found 
the similarity to be cognizable (though concededly, he did express some 
reservations about that377), and sent Arnstein’s fantastical story to a jury for 
determination on the appropriation question. Yet it would require the judge to 
explicate his or her analysis of the similarity in clear terms, based on expert 
evidence, and thereby allow for a rational jurisprudence of similarity to 
develop contextually over time. The following table illustrates the key 
elements of the revised infringement analysis proposed here. 
 
	
 377. See supra text accompanying notes 304-15 (discussing the correspondence between 
Judge Frank and Judge Clark on the meaning of the Arnstein opinion). 
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Table 1 
A Reformulated Infringement Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
The existing test for copyright infringement is entirely a creation of the 
courts, developed incrementally in true common law fashion. While prior 
opinions set out the contours of the test, Arnstein crystallized the analysis into a 
seemingly workable formula that has won the acceptance of American 
copyright jurisprudence in the decades since. Even when Congress chose to 
comprehensively codify copyright law in 1976, it left this area of law 
altogether untouched, thereby seemingly acquiescing to Arnstein’s 
formulation.378 While Arnstein may no longer be binding on courts as 
	
 378. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 61 (1976) (containing the only reference to the infringement 
analysis and noting that “a copyrighted work would be infringed by reproducing it in 
footnote continued on next page 
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precedent, its basic framework continues to exert an enormous influence on 
courts and copyright jurisprudence across the country. 
As this Article has shown, Arnstein’s entire analytical framework was built 
on a philosophical outlook—of skepticism towards rules, judges, and the law—
that Judge Frank developed over the course of his career, which has since been 
discredited by both courts and scholars. Driven by a mistrust of lower courts, 
rule-based decisionmaking, and the factfinding process, the Arnstein 
formulation was directed at ensuring little more than that Ira Arnstein, the 
infamous plaintiff in the case, obtained a jury trial merely because there 
appeared to be some similarity between his work and the defendant’s. Neither 
Judge Frank nor Judge Hand (who constituted the majority in the case) seems 
to have paid much attention to what the formulation meant for copyright law 
adjudication or indeed to the institution’s myriad goals and purposes.  
In the years since Arnstein, almost all of its underlying skeptical 
assumptions have come to be openly repudiated. Somewhat surprisingly 
though, its avowedly nonintellectual framework continues to endure, a reality 
that is perhaps best explained by the sheer path dependence of court-created 
doctrine. Nonetheless, as a product of the common law of copyright, courts 
should see little problem in comprehensively reformulating it so as to retain its 
adherence to some of copyright’s core ideals while abandoning its skeptical 
premises. Given that Congress played no role whatsoever in the development 
of the infringement analysis and indeed chose not to, courts—and not 
Congress—will need to assume primary responsibility for such reform. Until 
this occurs, Arnstein will, to use Judge Clark’s famous words, continue to 
“haunt” copyright jurisprudence with the “chaos” that it has engendered over 
the last seven decades.  
 
 
 
	
whole or in any substantial part, and by duplicating it exactly or by imitation or 
simulation”). 
